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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On April 23, 2009, the Utah Supreme Court granted HTC's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari for review of the November 20, 2008 decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Jurisdiction is proper in this case under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a). See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in interpreting a lease agreement to 
obligate the tenant to cure a previously undisclosed cloud on the landlord's title? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: HTC presented this issue in its Petition for 
Certiorari. {See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, on file with the Court, at 10-18.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Questions of contract interpretation are matters of 
law that the Utah Supreme Court reviews for correctness. See Fairbourn Commercial, 
Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, ^ 6, 94 P.3d 292. 
ISSUE II: Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in deciding that a landlord can 
lawfully confer standing to assert its property rights upon a tenant via a provision in a 
lease agreement? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: HTC presented this issue in its Petition for 
Certiorari. {See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, on file with the Court, at 19-20.) 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[A] determination of standing is generally a 
question of law, [that the Court] review[s] for correctness." Mellor v. Wasatch Crest 
Mut Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5,17, 201 P.3d 1004. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no governing constitutional or statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case requires a careful analysis of the nature and quality of ownership 
interests provided by a landlord to a tenant, as well as the fundamental distinction 
between the quality of such ownership interests and the uses allowed by the landlord on 
property. The Utah Court of Appeals' decision failed to recognize this distinction and, as 
a result, stands real property law on its head by ruling that HTC, as tenant, is responsible 
for a previously undisclosed cloud on landlord Brown's title. 
Additionally, this case involves a critical question of Utah standing law: Can 
parties confer legal standing via a contractual agreement? In holding that the language of 
the lease obligated HTC to assert a challenge to an encumbrance on the leased property, 
the Utah Court of Appeals effectively recognized that a landlord can confer standing to a 
tenant via a provision in a lease agreement. This recognition contravenes established law 
and public policy. 
2 
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1. Nature of the Case 
HTC initiated this action against Brown after Brown refused to address an 
undisclosed easement (the "Easement") clouding title to the property that Brown leased 
to HTC (the "Property"). As known to Brown and stated in the parties' lease agreement 
(the "Lease"), HTC's sole purpose in leasing the Property was to develop the Property as 
a shopping center. Indeed, express provisions in the Lease even allowed HTC to finance 
the Property to obtain capital funding to develop the shopping center. As tenant of the 
Property, HTC sought to have Brown, as landlord and owner of the Property, remove the 
cloud of title caused by the Easement and thereby provide the promised unencumbered 
fee simple real estate for use by HTC and allow for the financing and development of the 
shopping center. HTC cannot obtain a title policy for the Property without listing the 
Easement as an exception to coverage, regardless of whether it is an owner's policy or a 
lender's policy of title insurance. Because of the Easement and its non-insurable status, 
HTC is hindered from obtaining financing for development of or construction of the 
shopping center on the Property in the manner contemplated by the Lease. 
Rather than remove the Easement and thereby restore marketable title to the 
property for leasehold and purchase purposes, Brown argued below that the Easement 
was not a genuine cloud of title and that the Lease required HTC to either live with the 
Easement and whatever cloud on title it imposed or pay the significant legal fees and 
expend the considerable time necessary to remove the cloud itself. 
3 
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2. Trial Court Decision 
On August 9, 2006, HTC filed its Complaint against Brown, asserting claims for 
declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and specific performance. (R. at 1-40.) In 
response, Brown filed a motion to dismiss HTC's claims. (R. at 44-46.) Brown 
subsequently filed a counterclaim, alleging breach of contract, breach of good faith and 
fair dealing, waste of premises, and unjust enrichment. (R. at 393-99.) In December 
2006, HTC moved to dismiss Brown's counterclaim and moved for summary judgment 
on HTC's claims for declaratory judgment and specific performance. (R. at 405-07.) In 
early 2007, Brown filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on, inter alia, its breach 
of contract claim. (R. at 497-99.) The court heard oral argument on the parties' motions 
to dismiss and motions for summary judgment on March 12, 2007. (R. at 928.)1 
On May 1, 2007, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order ("Order"). (R. at 825-29.) A copy of the Order is attached hereto as 
Addendum A. In the Order, the trial court concluded, in relevant part, that no actual 
Easement exists on the Property. The trial court reasoned that "[b]ecause there is no 
[E]asment affecting [the Property], there is no basis for [HTC's] claims against [Brown] 
and this action should not have been brought against the landlord, causing the landlord to 
incur costs." (R. 827-28.) The trial court further reasoned that even if the Easement does 
1
 Each of the parties also filed motions to strike affidavits as part of the briefing for their 
competing motions. The motions to strike are not relevant to this appeal. 
4 
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"create[] legal requirements that interfere with [HTC's] use of its leasehold, [HTC] has 
the right under the [L]ease and by virtue of its leasehold to contest those legal 
requirements by quiet title action or otherwise, but such action should be conducted in 
such a manner as to result in no cost to [Brown.]" (R. at 827-28.) The trial court also 
pointed out that the Lease "provides that it is a triple net lease and that rent would be paid 
without offset and without cost to the landlord." (R. at 826.) Based on these conclusions, 
the trial court dismissed HTC's Complaint against Brown and ordered HTC to pay all of 
Brown's costs and attorney fees related to the action and to Brown's collection of rent 
from HTC. (R. at 828-29.) The Order also granted HTC leave to amend its Complaint. 
(R. at 828.)2 
3. Utah Court of Appeals Decision 
HTC appealed the trial court's decision to dismiss HTC's Complaint. On appeal, 
the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. See Holladay Towne 
Or., LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LC, 2008 UT App 420, «|[ 5, 198 P.3d 990. A copy 
of the court of appeals' opinion is attached hereto as Addendum B. In so doing, the 
appellate court concluded that "the language of the Lease resolves the question [of whose 
HTC filed a cross motion for summary judgment on Brown's claim of unlawful 
detainer. In its Order, the trial court concluded that HTC had not materially breached the 
Lease because HTC had desisted making late payments at Brown's request, HTC had 
made timely rent payments since Brown's request, and any costs to Brown as a result of 
late rental payments could be remedied by HTC's payment of Brown's attorney fees and 
costs. The Utah Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed this decision. The court of 
appeals' decision on this issue is not on certiorari before the Court. 
5 
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obligation it was to take care of an easement discovered after the commencement of the 
Lease] as to these parties." Id. at | 9. Specifically, the court stated thai "[i]n light of the 
language of the Lease, it is clear that the parties contracted so as to anticipate and resolve 
the very dispute presented in this appeal." Id. at Tf 10. Like the trial court, the Utah Court 
of Appeals emphasized that "the Lease was drafted as a triple-net lease to ensure that. . . 
Brown[] incurred no monetary obligations as a result of HTC leasing the Premises." Id. 
But the court further relied on the Lease's language that HTC shall either comply with all 
"Legal Requirements" in the use, occupation, control and enjoyment of the Property or 
HTC can exercise the "'right, at its own cost and expense, to contest or review by 
appropriate legal or administrative proceeding the validity or legality of any such Legal 
Requirement.'" Id. at j^ 11. Because the court determined that the defined term "Legal 
Requirements" included the Easement as a form of "'covenants, restrictions, and 
conditions now or hereafter of record which may be applicable to [HTC] or to all or any 
portion of the [Property],'" the court concluded that HTC had to either comply with the 
Easement or cure it at its own expense. Id. at 1fl[ 12-13. 
Based on its conclusion that the Lease language specifically answered the question 
of which party—the landlord or the tenant—had the obligation to cure the Easement, the 
Utah Court of Appeals stated it was declining to address the question of standing. See id. 
at Tf 13 n.3. This statement, however, belied the fact that in holding the Lease language 
required HTC to challenge the Easement, the court effectively recognized the legal 
6 
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validity of a landlord contractually conferring legal standing to assert its property rights 
on its tenant. 
4. Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
In early 2009, HTC filed a petition for writ of certiorari of the Utah Court of 
Appeals' November 20, 2008 decision. On April 23, 2009, this Court granted HTC's 
petition on the issues of whether the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that 
the Lease assigned responsibility to the tenant to redress subsequently discovered 
encumbrances on the Property, such as the Easement, and whether a lease can confer 
legal standing on a tenant to challenge the property rights of the landlord. A copy of this 
Court's Order Granting HTC's Petition for Writ of Certiorari is attached hereto as 
Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Brown is the fee owner of the Property. The Property constitutes 
approximately .44 acres, along with all rights and interest, located on Lot 27 in Holladay, 
Utah. (R. at 9, 37.) A copy of the Lease is attached hereto as Addendum D. 
2. On March 1, 2005, Brown and HTC entered into the Lease for the Property. 
(R. at 9.) 
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3. The Lease explicitly expresses the parties' understanding that HTC "may 
use the [Property] for a shopping center, retail store(s), office(s). . . [and] [HTC] may 
construct all the Improvements on the Land. . . ." (R. at 20.) 
4. The Lease states that Brown agrees to 
lease[] to [HTC] the [Property] . . . , together with all rights, 
privileges, easements, and appurtenances belonging to or in 
any way appertaining thereto, including but not limited to, 
any and all surface easements, rights, titles, and privileges of 
[Brown] now or hereafter existing in and to adjacent streets, 
sidewalks, and alleys for the (term of the Lease], at the rental, 
and upon all of the covenants and conditions set forth herein. 
(R.atl3.) 
5. Under the Lease, Brown agrees that it is delivering possession of the 
Property and all "rights, privileges, easements, and appurtenances" to HTC, subject only 
to the Permitted Exceptions expressly defined in the Lease. Permitted Exceptions are 
defined as "those matters described in Exhibit B attached hereto affecting Landlord's title 
to the Land all of which have been approved by Tenant." (R. at 11, 13, 38.) 
6. The only Permitted Exceptions listed in the Lease are "Property taxes and 
Assessments accruing for the year 2005 and thereafter." (R. at 11, 38.) 
7. Thus, the Permitted Exceptions expressly relate to the quality of title held 
by Brown, as landlord, and make no mention of any easement or other encumbrance on 
the Property. (R. at 38.) 
297882 3 
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8. At the time the parties entered into the Lease, neither party knew of the 
Easement. (R. at 827.) 
9. The Lease explicitly defines "Tenant's Estate" as "all of Tenant's right, title 
and interest in its leasehold estate in the Premises, its fee estate in the Improvements, and 
its interest under this Lease." (R. at 12.) In contrast, "Landlord's Estate" is defined as 
"all of Landlord's right, title, and interest in its fee estate in the Premises, its reversionary 
interest in the Improvements pursuant hereto, and all other Rent and benefits due 
Landlord hereunder." (R. at 10-11.) 
10. HTC bargained for its rights under the Lease on the representation that 
property taxes and assessments for 2005 and thereafter were the only Permitted 
Exceptions to Brown delivering full possession of the Property to HTC. (R. at 9.) 
11. Brown's representation in the Lease that there were no other 
encumbrances on the Property was a material and integral factor in HTC's decision to 
enter into the Lease. (R. at 159, <| 14.) 
12. To use the Property as HTC intended in entering into the Lease as a 
commercial shopping center, the Property must be free from encumbrances that prohibit 
the development or construction of improvements. (R. at 159, Tf 13.) 
13. In early 2006, HTC's review of a survey map of the Property revealed a 




14. In a letter dated April 7, 2006, HTC, through counsel, informed Brown 
of the Easement. (R. at 160, If 17, and 197.) 
15. In response, Brown refused to take any action to address the Easement, 
arguing instead that the Easement was per se invalid. (R. at 160, 1f 18.) 
16. Around the same time that HTC was corresponding with Brown 
regarding the Easement, HTC hired Joseph Capilli of the Talon Group (a division of First 
American Title Insurance Company) to research the title of the Property. (R. at 99, ^ 7, 
8; 160,H19.) 
17. Capilli's research revealed that prior to August 1980, lot 26 and lot 27 
were owned by the same owner, and, in August 1980, lot 26 was transferred with an 
Easement on the Property (lot 27) for parking and ingress and egress. Capilli's research 
further revealed that the Easement remained on the transferring documents of lot 26's 
current owners. (R. at 99-101; 103, fflf 10-15, 27.) 
18. Upon determining the existence of the Easement, Mr. Capilli met with 
HTC and Brown and explained that the title insurance company would be unable to issue 
a title insurance policy for the Property without excluding the Easemenl from coverage 
under such policy. (R. at 103, If 28.) 
19. Capilli subsequently prepared a Preliminary Title Report for the 




20. First American instructed HTC that regardless of whether it is an owner's 
policy or a lender's policy of title insurance, the title company would only issue a title 
policy for the Property if the Easement is listed as an exception to the policy. (R. at 104, ^ 
30.) 
21. Following this news, HTC again asked Brown to address the Easement. 
(R. at 160,^121,23.) 
22. Despite learning of the existence of the Easement from First American, 
Brown continued to reject HTC's request on grounds that the Easement is per se invalid. 
(R. at 160, Yfl 18,21,23.) 
23. Pursuant to default notice provisions under the Lease, on April 7, 2007, 
HTC sent Brown a letter informing Brown that it was in default of the Lease for failing to 
address the Easement. (R. at 29; 209,^20.) 
24. Because of the existence of the Easement, HTC cannot develop, construct, 
or obtain financing for the Improvements (defined in the Lease as "any structures 
hereafter constructed on and affixed to the [Property]" as it bargained for under the 
Lease. (R. at 10 (providing definition of "Improvements") ;161, f^ 24.) 
25. The Lease requires HTC to comply with "all Legal Requirements in the 
use, occupation, control and enjoyment of the [Property] and in the prosecution and 
conduct of its business thereon." (R, at 20; see also Lease at 12.) 
26. The Lease defines Legal Requirements as 
11 
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all present and future laws, statutes, requirements, ordinances, 
orders, judgments, regulations, administrative or judicial 
determinations, even if unforeseen or extraordinary, of every 
governmental or quasi-governmental authority, court or 
agency claiming jurisdiction over the [Property] now or 
hereafter enacted or in effect (including, but not limited to, 
Environment Laws and those relating to accessibility to, 
usability by, an discrimination against, disabled individuals), 
and all covenants, restrictions, and conditions now or 
hereafter or record which may be applicable to Tenant or 1o 
all or any portion of the Premises, or to the use, occupancy, 
possession, operation, maintenance, alteration, repair or 
restoration of any of the Premises, even if compliance 
therewith necessitates structural changes to the Improvements 
or the making of Improvements, or results in interference 
with the use or enjoyment of all or any portion of the 
Premises. 
(R. at 11; see also Lease at 3.) 
27. The Lease states that HTC has "the right at its own cost and expense, to 
contest or review by appropriate legal or administrative proceeding the validity or legality 
of any such Legal Requirement." (R. at 20; see also Lease at 12.) 
28. Paragraph 16 of the Lease provides to HTC an option to purchase the 
Property. Upon exercising such an option, HTC would acquire Landlord's Estate 
"subject to only the matters described in Section 1.1 [the property taxes and assessments 
accruing for the year 2005 and thereafter, as listed on Exhibit B of the Lease and defined 




29. Article 5 of the Lease contains detailed provisions expressly contemplating 
and allowing HTC the ability to mortgage the Property as part of obtaining funding for 
development of the shopping center. (R. at 15.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In interpreting the Lease to obligate HTC to cure the Easement affecting Brown's 
quality of title, the Utah Court of Appeals misapplied and disregarded established 
principles of contract interpretation. Specifically, the appellate court ignored the plain 
meaning of contractual terms, failed to harmonize and give effect to all terms, and 
adopted an interpretation that creates an absurd result when interpreted against 
established principles of real property jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Lease as providing 
HTC with the burden of challenging quality of title issues on behalf of Brown 
effectively recognizes and endorses contractual provisions that confer legal standing. 
Such a recognition contravenes established law and sound public policy. 
On these grounds, HTC respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter a 
judgment determining the Easement to be an encumbrance on Brown's fee-simple 





I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE LEASE AS 
ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY TO HTC, AS TENANT, TO CURE THE 
PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED CLOUD ON BROWN'S TITLE. 
In interpreting the Lease as requiring HTC to cure the previously undisclosed 
Easement, the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously disregarded several central principles 
of contract construction. Fundamentally, the court failed to interpret the Lease in 
accordance with its plain meaning. Additionally, the court failed to harmonize all terms 
and to construe like terms in the Lease similarly. The court's interpretation of the Lease 
also erroneously failed to give effect to all contract terms. Finally, the Utah Court of 
Appeal's interpretation leads to an absurd result as to Brown's quality of title in a lease-
hold transaction. 
A. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Contrary to the Plain Meaning of the Lease 
Utah contract law requires that "[an] unambiguous contract term be given its plain 
meaning." Level 3 Communications, LLC v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2007 UT App 127, ^ j 9, 
163 P.3d 652; see also Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 
54, Tj 10, 94 P.3d 292. Here, the court of appeals disregarded this principle by failing to 
recognize the well-established distinction between the meaning of the terms "easements" 
and "covenants, conditions, and restrictions." 
297882 3 
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Paragraph 6.3 of the Lease ascribes certain "Legal Requirements" that HTC must 
comply with or "at its own cost and expense;". . . contest or review by appropriate legal or 
administrative proceeding." The Lease defines "Legal Requirements" as 
all present and future laws, statutes, requirements, ordinances, 
orders, judgments, regulations, administrative or judicial 
determinations, even if unforeseen or extraordinary, of every 
governmental or quasi-governmental authority, court or 
agency claiming jurisdiction over the [Property] now or 
hereafter enacted or in effect (including, but not limited to, 
Environment Laws and those relating to accessibility to, 
usability by, an discrimination against, disabled individuals), 
and all covenants, restrictions, and conditions now or 
hereafter or record which may be applicable to Tenant or to 
all or any portion of the Premises, or to the use, occupancy, 
possession, operation, maintenance, alteration, repair or 
restoration of any of the Premises, even if compliance 
therewith necessitates structural changes to the Improvements 
or the making of Improvements, or results in interference 
with the use or enjoyment of all or any portion of the 
Premises. 
(Emphasis added.) Based on this definition, the court of appeals erroneously concluded 
that "[t]he Easement, to the extent it may have any validity, is clearly a 'covenant, 
restriction, or condition of record,'" and therefore, in light of Paragraph 6.3, HTC was 
obligated to either accept the Easement or to challenge it at its own expense and at no 
cost to Brown. Holladay Towne Ctr., LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, L.C, 2008 UT 
App420,^f 12, 198P.3d990. 
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This interpretation, however, ignores the ordinary and established difference 
between the encumbrance-based term easement and the contract-based nature of 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions. Specifically, 
covenants are created by promises concerning the land, which 
may be enforceable by or binding upon successors to the 
estate for either party, while an easement is an interest in the 
land, created by grant or prescription. . . . [A]n easement is 
essentially an inherently legal interest in land, as distinct 
from a restrictive covenant, which has been described as but 
a creature of equity arising out of contract. 
Jeffrey J. Shampo, 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants § 3. In harmony with such authority, "this 
[CJourt has characterized easements as interests in land."' Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm % 1999 UT 90, t 10, 987 P.2d 594; Wells v. Marcus, 480 P.2d 
129, 130 (Utah 1971) ("The right sought by the defendants to maintain a pipeline across 
the plaintiffs land would be an easement, and thus an interest in land."); Warburton v. 
Virginia Beach Savings & Loan Ass % 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah App. 1995) ("[A]n 
easement is an interest in land within the meaning of the statute of frauds and must, 
therefore, be evidenced by a writing."). In contrast to easements, and similar to 
covenants, conditions and restrictions are contract based. See, e.g., Black's Law 
Dictionary 335, 1429 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "restriction" as "[a] limitation (esp. in a 
deed) placed on the use or enjoyment of the property"). 
Instead of following this well-established authority, the court essentially confuses 
use-restrictions—that do not affect quality of title—with encumbrances, like the 
16 
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Easement, that undermine fee simple title. Accordingly, in incorrectly classifying the 
Easement as a covenant, condition, and restriction, the court of appeals erroneously 
determined that the Easement constituted a Legal Requirement that HTC was obligated to 
challenge at its own expense. 
The Utah Court of Appeals also misinterpreted the plain meaning and nature of the 
term "triple-net lease" and, consequently, misconstrued the import of the Lease being a 
triple-net lease in deciding that HTC was obligated to cure the Easement. In its decision, 
the Utah Court of Appeals stressed that because the Lease is a triple-net lease, the parties 
did not intend for Brown to incur any costs related to HTC leasing the Property, including 
any costs associated with Brown's quality of title, such as the Easement. See Holladay, 
2008 UT App 420 at f^ 11 (u[T]he Lease was drafted as a triple-net lease to ensure that. . 
. Brown[] incurred no monetary obligations as a result of HTC leasing the Premises."). 
This conception of a triple-net lease fails to recognize that the expenses triple net leases 
intend to cover are only use-based expenses; triple-net leases are not, by their very 
nature, intended to include costs arising from challenges to the landlord's underlying fee-
simple title to the leased property. 
By definition, a triple-net lease is a common legal form that allows the landlord to 
collect net rent, free from costs of maintenance, property taxes, insurance, and other 
similar property-related expenses associated with use of the property. See, e.g., Cent. 
States, S.E. & S W. Areas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 642 (7th Cir. 2001) 
17 
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(defining a triple-net lease as "one in which the tenant incurs many of the obligations of 
rental such as maintenance, operating expenses, real estate taxes and insurance"); 
Amalgamated Bank of Chicago v. Kalmus & Associates, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (111. 
Ct. App. 2000) ("[A] triple net lease requires the tenant to pay insurance, taxes and 
utilities in addition to rent."); Fisher Properties, Inc. v. Ar den-May fair, Inc., 798 P.2d 
799, 803 (Wash. 1990) ("The lease at issue is a triple net lease, which means the tenant 
bears the operating expenses."); California Nat. Bank v. Woodbridge Plaza LLC, 78 
Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) ("The lease called for triple net rent (meaning 
the tenant pays for property taxes and expenses.")). That is, contrary to the court of 
appeals' interpretation, triple-net leases are limited to only costs and expenses associated 
with ongoing use, of the property by the recognized fee owner or its designated tenant, as 
opposed to fees and expenses associated with a third party challenging 1he fundamental 
ownership rights of the property owner. 
Thus, the court of appeals' interpretation of a triple-net lease confuses the type of 
monetary obligations allocated to a tenant under a triple-net lease. If a third party 
challenged Brown, or any landlords' fee-simple ownership (the ownership status that 
provides an accompanying right to lease the use of the property to others), Brown 
invariably would incur monetary obligations defending its claim of ownership. But such 
a dispute would not be HTC's, nor any tenant's, issue to resolve. The Easement herein is 
no different conceptually: it represents a third party's claim to the ownership rights of 
18 
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Brown in contravention of the status of those rights as Brown had represented them to 
HTC. 
B. In Interpreting the Lease, the Court of Appeals Failed to Harmonize All Terms 
and Neglected to Construe Like Terms Similarly 
In its interpretation of the Lease, in particular Paragraph 6.3 and the definition of 
"Legal Requirements," the Utah Court of Appeals disregarded the principle that the court 
must "attempt to harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its terms." Alpha 
Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 2006 UT App 331, ^ 19, 153 P.3d 714. 
Furthermore, the court of appeals neglected that "where general terms follow specific 
ones, the rules of construction, including noscitur a sociis, i t is known from its 
associates,' and ejusdem generis, 'of the same kind,' require that the general terms be 
given a meaning that is restricted to a sense analogous to the preceding specific terms." 
Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1989) (applying rules of construction in 
statutory context) (citation omitted); see also Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 
2008 UT 82, f 33, 199 P.3d 957 (stating that "a general term included within a list of 
more specific terms should be given a meaning that is analogous to the other terms within 
the list"). 
Paragraph 6.3 of the Lease states as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of Article 8 below, Tenant shall 
comply with all Legal Requirements in the use, occupation, 
control and enjoyment of the Premises and in the prosecution 
and conduct of its business thereon. Tenant shall have the 
19 
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right, at its own cost and expense, to contest or review by 
appropriate legal or administrative proceeding the validity or 
legality of any such Legal Requirement, and during such 
contest Tenant may refrain from complying therewith 
provided that compliance therewith may legally be held in 
abeyance without subjecting Landlord to any liability, civil or 
criminal, of whatsoever nature for failure so to comply 
therewith and without the incurrence of a lien, charge or 
liability against the Premises or Landlord's Estates and 
provided further that all such proceedings shall be prosecuted 
by Tenant with due diligence. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, the full text of the defined term "Legal Requirements" (as referenced in 
paragraph 6.3) states as follows: 
Legal Requirements means all present and future laws, 
statutes, requirements, ordinances, orders, judgments, 
regulations, administrative or judicial determinations, even if 
unforeseen or extraordinary, of every governmental or quasi-
governmental authority, court or agency claiming jurisdiction 
over the Premises now or hereafter enacted or in effect 
(including, but not limited to Environmental Laws and those 
relating to accessibility to, usability by, and discrimination 
against, disabled individuals), and all covenants, restrictions, 
and conditions now or hereafter of record which may be 
applicable to Tenant or to all or any portion of the Premises, 
or to the use, occupancy, possession, operation, maintenance, 
alteration, repair or restoration of any of the Premises, even 
if compliance therewith necessitates structural changes to the 
Improvements or the making of Improvements, ore results in 





When read together and in their entirety, Paragraph 6.3 and the definition of Legal 
Requirements do not, contrary to the court of appeals' opinion, include easements 
claimed by third parties that affect the quality and status of title to the leased property. 
Instead, the emphasized terms of "use, occupation, control and enjoyment of the 
Premises" in Paragraph 6.3 underscore the nature of Legal Requirements. None of these 
terms relate to ownership and quality of title, but rather they relate to the day-to-day use 
of the Property. Likewise, those emphasized terms in the definition of Legal 
Requirements reveal the concept of day-to-day use and enjoyment of the Property - not 
ownership and the quality of title. Also, the definition of Legal Requirements includes a 
laundry list of actions by governmental or quasi-governmental authorities related to the 
Property (i.e. zoning laws and similar enactments) as well as CC&Rs (similar private 
restrictions made by contract). These specified actions do not relate to the overall quality 
of title held by the property owner, but rather are use_ restrictions on the occupant of the 
Property, whether that occupant is the owner or the lessee. The Lease addressed title in 
Paragraph 1.1 (not in Paragraph 6.3) and the permitted exceptions referenced therein. 
C. The Utah Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Lease Rendered Terms 
Meaningless 
A central tenet of Utah contract construction law is that courts must "considers] 
each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving 
effect to all and ignoring none." Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 
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UT 7, ^ 15, —P.3d—. The court of appeals' interpretation of the Lease discounted this 
key principle. For instance, based on the court of appeals' interpretation, how does HTC 
"refrain from complying" with the Easement, or any encumbrance, as Paragraph 6.3 
states it is entitled to do? Further, how can HTC challenge the Easement, or any 
easement, without it becoming a "lien, charge or liability against the Premises or 
Landlord's Estate"? Such language from paragraph 6.3 makes no sense - and indeed 
must be ignored in an attempt to create any sense - under the court of appeals' 
interpretation because an easement, by its nature, is a lien, charge or liability against 
Brown's estate, and is nothing from which HTC, as tenant, has an option to refrain from 
complying with. Notably, however, this same Lease language is not effectively ignored 
and makes perfect sense if construed correctly to apply to government regulations such as 
zoning laws or private contract-based restrictions on use, such as CC&Rs. 
In addition, the proper interpretation of Legal Requirements (as excluding the 
Easement) also gives meaning to Paragraphs 1.1 and 16 of the Lease. Tellingly, the 
Court of Appeals ignores Paragraph 1.1 altogether in its analysis. Seemingly, this is 
because there is no credible way to give meaning to Brown's representations of "fee 
simple" ownership and the express recitation of the "Permitted Exceptions" that HTC 
agreed upon in paragraph 1.1 of the Lease (only the taxes and assessment expressly listed 
on Exhibit B of the Lease). 
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Similarly, there is no explanation in the court of appeals' analysis for why the 
purchase option provisions of Paragraph 16.5 make clear that the Landlord's Estate can 
be "subject to only the matters described in Section 1.1 [the taxes and assessments listed 
on Exhibit B] and other matters reasonably approved by Tenant." Further, there is no 
explanation by the court of appeals as to the inability of HTC to obtain title insurance on 
the Property upon purchasing it because of the Easement, despite the express requirement 
in paragraph 16.5(f) of the Lease that the Landlord would provide "at its sole expense a 
standard form of Owner's Title Insurance Policy issued by First American Title Insurance 
Company."3 
In reality, a correct interpretation of the Lease makes clear that HTC bargained for 
Brown's conveyance of all fee-simple interest in the Property except for those permitted 
exceptions detailed in the Lease, i.e., potential encumbrances in the form of the taxes and 
assessments from 2005 forward, as expressly listed in Exhibit B of the Lease. 
Accordingly, the Lease was supposed to give HTC the right to use of all ownership 
interest claimed by Brown that existed at the time the parties entered into the Lease. In 
entering into the Lease, HTC did not bargain for the Easement as consideration for lease 
payments. 
3
 As stated in the record, Joseph Capilli of The Talon Group, a division of First American 
Title Insurance Company, indicated that such a title insurance policy could not be 
provided unless the easement was removed from coverage. (R. at 104, j^ 30.) 
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D. The Utah Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Lease Creates Absurd 
Results as to Brown's Quality of Title 
It is well settled that Utah courts will "not endorse . . . an absurd interpretation" of a 
contract. See Okelberry v. W. Daniels Land Ass fn, 2005 UT App 327, «f 24, 120 P.3d 34. 
However, that is precisely what the Utah Court of Appeals did by failing to fathom the 
core distinction between matters affecting quality of title (i.e. encumbrances that go to the 
heart of whether the landlord has provided the full bundle of property rights to the tenant 
in exchange for the rent paid and bargained for) and those affecting use of the premises 
(i.e., the manner in which the tenant occupies the premises after having received the full 
bundle of property rights from the landlord). Instead of recognizing this distinction, the 
Utah Court of Appeals has effectively rendered tenants everywhere the unwitting title 
insurers of their landlords. Such a result is absurd, particularly when a lease, like the 
Lease herein, expressly lists the encumbrances that affect title that have been agreed 
upon. Cf. Lankfordv. Tennefoss, No. 97-12-053, 1998 WL 1557441, at *2 (Del. Com. 
PL Oct. 20, 1998) ("It is not the duty of a lessee to clear title for the lessor."); see also 
Barfieldv. Damon, 245 P.2d 1032, 1034 (N.M. 1952) ("The law supposed that when a 
man makes a lease, he has a good title to the land.").4 
4
 Owners of real property sometimes have easements or other encumbrances that burden 
some aspect of the use of their property and nevertheless still enter into a lease 
agreement. This is proper if the lease rights provided in the lease expressly carve out 
such encumbrances. This did not occur in the Lease with respect to the Easement. 
Absent such limiting representations, the presumption of every tenant is that they are 
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Furthermore, after reading the Utah Court of Appeals decision, crafty landlords 
undoubtedly will insert into their leases similar definitions of "Legal Requirements," as 
used in the Lease and endorsed by the court of appeals, particularly given that, based on 
the court of appeals' decision, such language will be deemed to trump even express 
representations made by the landlord as to the quality/status of title. The Court of 
Appeals opinion will therefore be fodder for landlord-oriented attorneys to argue that 
their clients need not have actual fee-simple title ownership in property that they lease. 
Such a result will literally dismantle real property leasehold law in Utah, unless corrected 
by this Court. See Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734, 738 (Utah 2002) ("When the 
court of appeals renders a decision on an issue, that decision is automatically part of the 
law of this state, unless and until contravened by this court, the legislature, or the people 
through the processes authorized for the making of new law."). 
leasing from the landlord the full bundle of fee-simple absolute property rights, as the 
cases cited above make clear. Here, not only did Brown fail to enumerate any exceptions 
to fee-simple ownership as part of the Lease, it expressly promised to lease the Property 
"together will all rights, privileged, easements, and appurtenances belonging to or in way 
appertaining thereto, including but not limited to, any and all surface easements, rights, 
titles, and privileges of [Brown] now or hereafter existing in and to adjacent streets, 
sidewalks and alleys for the Term, at the rental, and upon all covenants and conditions set 
forth herein." (Emphasis added.) 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THAT A LANDLORD 
MAY CONFER STANDING TO ASSERT ITS PROPERTY RIGHTS TO A 
TENANT VIA A PROVISION IN THE LEASE AGREEMENT. 
In interpreting the Lease to require HTC to challenge the Easement, the Utah 
Court of Appeals effectively recognized the legal validity of contractual agreements to 
confer standing. This recognition contradicts established law holding that legal standing 
cannot be contractually conferred. Furthermore, this Court treats standing as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite and has made clear that parties cannot contractually agree to 
imbue a court with jurisdiction. This Court should hesitate to affirm a decision that runs 
contrary to law and sound public policy. See Fralley v. McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 211 
P.2d 840, 847 (Utah 1949) ("If by any reasonable construction the contract can be 
declared lawful and not in contravention of public welfare, it is [the Court's] duty to so 
interpret it."). 
Courts recognize that parties cannot confer standing by contractual agreement. 
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998); Rosen v. Tennessee 
Com'r of Finance & Admin., 288 F.3d 918, 931 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Lacombe v. City 
of Cheyenne, 733 P.2d 601, 603 (Wyo. 1987) ("We do not permil parties to confer 
standing by agreement.").5 This principle is in accord with Utah decisions holding that 
5
 This issue has been raised regularly in other legal contexts, such as patent cases. In the 
patent context, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that unless a contract grants ownership 
rights in the patent (i.e., exclusivity), a contractual right to sue does not confer standing. 
See Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 38-39 (1923). 
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"a party may generally assert only his or her own rights and cannot raise the claims of 
third parties who are not before the court." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, 
114, 86P.3d735. 
Moreover, this Court has made clear that legal "standing is a jurisdictional 
requirement." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ^ 12, 154 P.3d 808; see also Utah Chapter 
of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d 960 ("[Standing triggers 
the court's . . . subject matter jurisdiction."). As this Court has further expounded, "it is 
well settled that. . . parties . . . cannot, by agreement, confer jurisdiction upon the court.'" 
Phoenix Indemn. Ins. v. Smith, 2002 UT 49, 48 P.3d 976; see also A.J. Mackay Co. v. 
Okland Const Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991) ("[Acquiescence of the parties 
is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. . . ."); Hardy v. Meadows, 264 P. 968, 
974, 71 Utah 255 (Utah 1928) ("Jurisdiction over the subject-matter cannot be conferred 
by the consent of the parties."). Other courts concur. See, e.g., Wilson v. Glenwood 
Intermountain Props., Inc., 98 F.3d 590, 593 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Standing is a 
jurisdictional issue" and "parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the courts 
"Courts have continued to affirm the Crown Die decision in varying factual contexts, 
each reaching the conclusion that parties cannot create standing by agreement, and the 
mere contractual right to sue, without some beneficial proprietary interest in the patent, 
cannot confer standing under the patent laws." Natl Licensing Ass'n, LLC v. Inland 
Joseph Fruit Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1251 (E.D. Wash. 2004). Similarly, because the 
Lease grants a possessory interest, not an ownership interest, in the Property, it cannot 
create standing by simply providing HTC with the right to sue on Brown's behalf. 
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by agreement."); In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 176 F.R.D. 99, 102-03 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Standing is a jurisdictional matter which must be resolved by the 
court; parties cannot either waive or confer standing by agreement."). 
Although parties are free to contract for many things, a court's jurisdiction, and as 
a corollary, legal standing, should not be open to bartering. Utah law does "not give[] . . . 
[parties the] right to waive or contract away what concerns the state itself," Hardy, 264 
P. at 974. As this Court has noted, "what disorder would be created were parties 
permitted by agreement to confer jurisdiction" on a court. Id. If "Utah standing law 
'operates as gatekeeper to the courthouse," as this Court has emphasized, this Court 
should hesitate to affirm a decision that allows parties to contractually sidestep the 
gatekeeper altogether. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 
74, H 17, 148P.3d960.6 
Given that tenants do not have standing to address ownership interests (tenants 
accept whatever property "bundle of sticks" the landlord has to give), the public policy 
6
 The trial court's decision seemingly engaged in analysis of the relative strength of the 
Easement. Whether it is a "strong" or "weak" easement is not the issue that is central to 
this case. In recognition of principles of standing articulated herein, HTC simply has 
sought to have Brown redress the Easement that has created a cloud on title and affected 
HTC's ability to finance and develop a shopping center. It could be that the Easement is 
easily addressed by obtaining recordable documents from the beneficiary verifying its 
abandonment or by a relatively quick legal proceeding. HTC hopes this to be the case. 
The point, however, is that only the landlord who possesses ownership rights that have 




concerns surrounding recognition of lease terms that foist ownership challenges on 
tenants would be significant. Such provisions would force a tenant to assume all risk of 
any undiscovered encumbrances on the leased property without the legal ability to redress 
the same. Stated differently, recognition of such lease terms in the face of extant 
standing law thus would burden tenants with all costs and consequences of any 
previously undiscovered encumbrance on the leased property. 
In short, this Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals' decision that HTC 
is obligated under the Lease to cure the Easement because that decision effectively 
recognizes, in contravention of law and sound public policy, that a landlord can 
contractually confer legal standing on a tenant to litigate the landlord's property rights. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, HTC respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and remand this matter with instructions for the 
trial court to enter a judgment determining the easement to be an encumbrance on 
Brown's fee simple ownership that Brown is required to remedy in order to comply with 
representations made in the Lease as to the quality of title held. 
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DATED this / / / d a y of July 2009. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
'obyn S. Wicks 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Holladay Towne Center, L.L.C. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE CITY, STATEOF UTAFI 
HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, L.L.C., i 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROWN FAMILY HOLDINGS, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No.: 060913167 
: Judge John Paul Kennedy 
This matter came on regularly for hearing ou the parties* cross motions for summary 
judgment on March 12,2007. Plaintiff was represented by Blake Miller, defendant was represented 
by Blalce S. Atkin. Having read the written submissions of the parties, having heard the arguments 
of counsel and being folly advised in the premises, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real property that is the subject of this dispute is in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
Thlrtt AreficJal District 
MAY 0 ! 2007 
Deputy Gterii 
2. Defendant is the fee owner of aparcel of real estate known as lot 27, Peony gardens, 
3. In March of 2005, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Ground Lease with regard 
to 1 ot 27. The Ground Lease provides that it is a triple net lease and that rent would be paid without 
i 
offset and without cost to the landlord. The Ground Lease further authorises the Tenant to contest, 
at its own expense, any legal requirements, defined as including any covenants restrictions or 
conditions of record. The Ground Lease also provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in 
actions relating to the Ground Lease. 
4. In about 1980, the owner of Lot 27, who also owned lot 26, Peony Gardens, recorded 
a notice of contract on lot 26 that described an easement across lot 27. That notice of contract was 
never recorded against lot 27. 
5. Thereafter, lot 27 was conveyed to defendant's predecessor in title without any 
mention of the easement 
6. Through mesne conveyances, none ofwhich mention the easement, the property came 
into the possession and ownership of defendant 
7. The easement was never recorded against lot 27. 
8. There is no evidence of the easement on the ground. For at least the past 20 years, 
the path of the easement has been impassable because of the existence of aberm and for the past 10 
years, permanent storage facilities have been built upon the path of the easement 
9. No one has ever made a claim to the easement or attempted to use the easement. 
2 
10. No one has ever tried to interfere with plaintiffs quiet enjoyment of its leasehold on 
account of the easement 
11. At the time they entered into the ground lease, neither party had any knowledge of 
the casement 
12. On August 9, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in Third District 
Court seeking declaratory relief, breach of contract, and specific performance, claiming that the 
casement is a violation of the lease. 
13. In November, 2006, defendant filed a counterclaim for unlawful detainer pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-36-8 claiming that the suit and defendants prior pattern of not making 
rental payments until plcuntiffhad hired a lawyer to demand payment were in breach of the lease by 
violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and causing the Landlord to incur costs in 
connection with the collection of rents. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There is no easement on lot 27. There is no evidence of an easement on the ground 
and to the extent that an easement purporting to affect lot 27 is recorded against lot 26, that easement 
is void because it was not recorded against lot 27. 
2. Because there is no easement affecting lot 27, there is no basis for the plaintiffs 
claims against the defendant and this action should not have been brought against the landlord, 
causing the landlord to incur costs. 
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3. If the easement anciently recorded against lot 26 creates legal requirements that 
interfere v/ith plaintiffs use of its leasehold, plaintiff has the right under the lease and by virtue of 
its leasehold to contest those legal requirements by quiet title action or otherwise, but such action 
should be conducted in such a manner as to result in no cost to the Landlord. 
4. The plaintiffs pattern of late rental payments, while not appropriate conduct, is not 
a material breach of the lease at this time where the conduct stopped at the demand of the Landlord 
and has been followed by consistent on time rental payments. The costs to the Landlord caused by 
that behavior can be remedied at this time by the payment of the Landlord's attorney fees and costs. 
The filing of this action, while not appropriate conduct under the lease, is not a material breach of 
the ltass because the cost caused to the Landlord can be remedied at this time by the payment of the 
Landlord's attorney fees and costs. 
ORDER 
1. Plaintiffs complaint against defendant will be dismissed, no cause of action. 
2. Defendant's counterclaim forunlawfiil detainer will be dismissed without prejudice, 
should the conduct of the Tenant be repeated in the future, 
3. Leave is granted to the plaintiff to'amend the complaint in this matter, so long as the j ^ 
allegations of the amended Complaint require nothing on the part of the Landlord except to file a 
notice of no contest to any action to quiet title against the" easement 
4. Plaintiff shall pay all of defendant's costs and attorney fees relating to this action and 
TO 
£ ^ ~ k*H?£?'1 > *» 7^^d 
to defendant's collection of rena Such costs^d attorney fees shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED this j _ _ day ofMarlh, 2007. 
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Holladay Towne Center, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, and 
Cross-appellee, 
v. 
Brown Family Holdings, LC, a 
Utah limited liability 
company, 
Defendant, Appellee, and 
Cross-appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20070496-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 20, 2008) 
2008 UT App 420 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 060913167 
The Honorable John Paul Kennedy 
Attorneys: Blake D. Miller, James W. Anderson, and Joel T. 
Zenger, Salt Lake City, for Appellant and Cross-
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THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge: 
%1 Holladay Towne Center, LLC (HTC) appeals from the district 
court's judgment dismissing HTC's declaratory judgment, breach of 
contract, and specific performance claims against Brown Family 
Holdings, LC (the Browns). The Browns cross-appeal, challenging 
as error the district court's conclusion that certain actions 
taken by HTC did not constitute a material breach of contract, as 
was counterclaimed by the Browns. We affirm the district court's 
judgment as to both HTC's claims and the Browns' counterclaims, 
but reverse the award of attorney fees in favor of the Browns and 
remand that issue for further consideration in the district 
court. 
BACKGROUND 
|2 In March 2005, HTC and the Browns entered into a ground 
lease (the Lease) for a .44 acre parcel of property {the 
Premises) . HTC intended to develop a large shopping center in 
the area, and the Lease specifically provided HTC with the 
ability to demolish existing buildings on the Premises and to 
construct new improvements. The Lease was structured as a 
triple-net lease to ensure that the Browns would have no expenses 
related to the Premises over the term of the Lease.1 
|3 In November 2005, HTC discovered an apparent easement (the 
Easement) across the Premises in favor of an adjoining landowner. 
The Easement was not identified in the Lease as a permitted 
exception to the Browns1 delivery of possession of the Premises 
to HTC. HTC notified the Browns of the Easement and demanded 
that the Browns take steps to remove it, claiming that the 
Easement's existence was preventing HTC from obtaining financing 
for its development project. The Browns declined to take any 
action and informed HTC that they did not believe the Easement 
was valid. 
^4 In August 2006, HTC sued the Browns, asserting claims for 
declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and specific 
performance. The gravamen of HTC's suit was that the Lease 
required the Browns to provide HTC with possession of the 
Premises unencumbered by any easements not excepted and that the 
Browns1 failure to take action to remove the Easement upon its 
discovery constituted a breach of their obligations under the 
Lease.2 The Browns brought counterclaims for breach of contract 
and unlawful detainer, asserting that HTC had acted in bad faith 
by initiating this litigation and by repeatedly paying the rent 
late in an attempt to put pressure on the Browns to address the 
Easement. The Browns characterized HTC's actions as a default of 
the Lease. 
1. A triple-net lease, or net-net-net lease, is a "lease in 
which the lessee pays all the expenses, including mortgage 
interest and amortization, leaving the lessor with an amount free 
of all claims." Blacks Law Dictionary 908 (8th ed. 2004). The 
Lease further clarified that HTC would "pay all impositions and 
costs relating to the [Premises] so that the [Browns will have] 
no cost or expense relating to the [Premises] during the term or 
any extension of the lease." 
2. There is no suggestion that either party was aware of the 
Easement at the time the Lease was executed. 
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%5 Both parties sought summary judgment. After a hearing on 
the parties1 dueling motions, the district court dismissed both 
HTC's lawsuit and the Browns' counterclaim for unlawful detainer. 
In its May 1, 2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, the district court determined that the Easement was 
invalid as between the parties; that because the Easement was 
invalid, there was no basis for HTC's claims; that HTC had the 
right to challenge the Easement against the adjoining landowner 
if it so desired but could only do so at no cost to the Browns; 
and that HTC's late rent payments, while inappropriate, did not 
constitute a material breach of the Lease. The district court 
granted HTC leave to amend its complaint to challenge the 
Easement against the adjoining landowner so long as the amendment 
required nothing of the Browns beyond the filing of notice that 
they did not contest the action. The district court also ordered 
HTC to pay all of the Browns' attorney fees and costs related to 
the action as a remedy for what it concluded was HTC's 
M
 [in]appropriate conduct" under the Lease. HTC appeals, and the 
Browns cross-appeal, from the district court's order. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
^6 HTC argues that the district court erred by concluding that 
HTC had standing to challenge the Easement against the adjoining 
landowner, by ruling on the validity of the Easement as between 
the existing parties, and by interpreting the Lease to place the 
obligation of challenging the Easement on HTC rather than the 
Browns. "A district court's summary judgment decision presents a 
question of law that this court reviews for correctness." 
Superior Receivable Servs- v. Pett, 2008 UT App 225, % 2, 191 
P.3d 31. To the extent that HTC's arguments challenge the 
district court's interpretation of the Lease, these arguments 
also present legal questions that we review for correctness. See 
Richins Drilling, Inc. v. Golf Servs. Group, Inc., 2008 UT App 
262, ^ 2, 189 P.3d 1280, cert, denied. No. 20080660 (Utah Oct. 
15, 2008) . 
f7 On cross-appeal, the Browns argue that the district court 
erred in its determination that HTC's actions, including 
intentionally withholding rent and initiating this unsuccessful 
litigation, did not constitute a material breach of the Lease. 
The Browns' cross-appeal of the district court's summary judgment 
ruling presents questions of law that we review for correctness. 
See Superior Receivable Servs. , 2008 UT App 225, t 2. 
%8 Finally, HTC challenges the district court's award of 
attorney fees and costs to the Browns, arguing that the Browns' 
affidavit in support of attorney fees was inadequate and that the 
district court erred in failing to reduce the fee award in 
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proportion to the parties' relative success in the litigation. 
We review the district court's calculation of an attorney fees 
award under an abuse of discretion standard. See Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) . 
ANALYSIS 
I, HTCfs Appeal 
%9 We first address HTC's arguments regarding the district 
court' s determination of the validity of the Easement and its 
rulings on HTC's ability and obligation to challenge the Easement 
as against the adjoining landowner. Early in its appellate 
brief, HTC characterizes its appeal as presenting a 
straightforward question about obligations incurred under the 
Lease: "Whose obligation is it to take care of an easement 
discovered after the commencement of a lease?" We agree with HTC 
that this is the central question presented by its appeal. 
However, we need not answer that question in abstract terms 
because here it is apparent that the language of the Lease 
resolves the question as to these parties. 
f^lO The Lease is a contract, and in interpreting the Lease we 
"'first look[] to the contract's four corners to determine the 
parties' intentions, which are controlling, ' " Baxter v. Saunders 
Outdoor Adver. , Inc. , 2007 UT App 340, U 11, 171 P. 3d 469 
(alteration in original) (quoting Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. 
American Hous. Partners, Inc. , 2004 UT 54, 1| 10, 94 P. 3d 292) . 
In the absence of ambiguity, which no one argues here, we 
determine the parties' intentions as a matter of law under the 
plain contractual language. See id. In light of the language of 
the Lease, it is clear that the parties contracted so as to 
anticipate and resolve the v€»ry dispute presented in this appeal. 
1(11 As previously noted, the* Lease was drafted as a triple-net 
lease to ensure that the Browns incurred no monetary obligations 
as a result of HTC leasing the Premises. However, the Lease goes 
further and specifically addresses HTCfs ability to challenge 
legal encumbrances affecting the Premises during the term of the 
Lease. Article 6.3 of the Lease requires HTC to comply with 
"Legal Requirements" as defined in the Lease and provides, in 
part, that HTC "shall have the right, at its own cost and 
expense, to contest or review by appropriate legal or 
administrative proceeding the validity or legality of any such 
Legal Requirement." The Lease defines Legal Requirements to 
include "all covenants, restrictions, and conditions now or 
hereafter of record which may be applicable to [HTC] or to all or 
any portion of the Premises,11 even if compliance with such 
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requirements "results in interference with the use or enjoyment 
of all or any portion of the Premises." 
[^12 This language clearly indicates that HTC may, independently 
of the Browns, challenge the validity of the Easement. The 
Easement, to the extent it may have any validity, is clearly a 
covenant, restriction, or condition of record that affects both 
the Premises and HTC's use and enjoyment thereof. As such, HTC 
is either obligated to comply with the Easement under the terms 
of the Lease, or it may challenge the Easement at its own expense 
and at no cost to the Browns. 
[^13 The district courtfs resolution of HTC's claims comports 
with the obligations incurred by the parties under the Lease. 
Because HTC contracted to either abide by restrictions such as 
the Easement or challenge them itself, the district court 
properly dismissed HTC's claims alleging that the Browns had 
breached the Lease by failing to address the Easement. At the 
same time, the district court allowed HTC to amend its complaint 
to name the adjoining landowner as a party defendant so long as 
HTC could do so at negligible cost to the Browns. This 
resolution enforces the Lease tearms as drafted by the parties and 
comports with the partiesf expressed intent that HTC bear all 
costs and expenses associated with the Lease. Accordingly, we 
affirm the district court!s ruling dismissing HTC's claims.3 
II, The Browns' Cross-appeal 
f^l4 On cross-appeal, the Browns challenge the district court's 
conclusion that HTC did not materially breach the Lease. The 
Browns argue that HTC's undisputed actions in delaying rent 
payments and initiating this litigation constitute bad faith and 
establish HTC's default of the Lease as a matter of law. Again, 
we look to the language of the Lease and affirm the district 
court. 
fl5 The Lease provides that rent was due from HTC to the Browns 
on the first day of each month. However, the Lease also 
expressly determines when the late payment of rent would 
constitute a default. Under the terms of the Lease, the late 
payment of rent constit&tes a default when HTC "shall have failed 
3. We see no need at this time to address HTC's standing 
concerns, or its argument that the district court erred in 
addressing the validity of the Easement as between the parties. 
In light of our determination that HTC may challenge the Easement 
regardless of its validity, the district court's determination 
that the Easement is invalid as between the parties is harmless 
even if it could be characterized as error. 
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to pay the [r] ent within fifteen (15) days of when due and such 
failure shall not have been cured within ten (10) days after 
receipt of written notice from [the Browns] respecting such 
overdue [r]ent payment." The Lease also provides for default in 
the event that HTC fails to perform any term, covenant, or 
condition of the Lease and then fails to cure its lack of 
performance within thirty days of notice. Additionally, the 
Browns characterize HTC's initiation and maintenance of this 
action as a default under the Lease, arguing that HTC failed to 
dismiss the action within thirty days of written notice and 
demand that it do so. 
fl6 Interpreting the parties' intentions under the plain 
language of the Lease, see Baxter v. Saunders Outdoor Adver. , 
Inc., 2007 UT App 340, \ 11, 171 P.3d 469, we hold that HTC's 
actions pertaining to the payment of rent fell within the 
parties' expressed intention to allow a grace period for the late 
payment of rent. If it was intended that the repeated late 
payment of rent under the default provision would itself 
constitute a default, the parties could have so provided in the 
Lease. They did not. Accordingly, HTC was nominatlly within its 
rights under the Lease to withhold rent each month until the 
tenth day after notice of nonpayment by the Browns. Further, as 
noted by the district court, HTC's late payments ceased upon 
demand by the Browns. 
Kl7 Similarly, the Lease does not contemplate default merely 
because HTC sued the Browns for claims arising out of the Lease. 
Indeed, the Lease anticipates such litigation by including a 
reciprocal attorney fees clause. That same clause* provides the 
penalty for unsuccessful litigation--the payment of the 
prevailing party's fees and costs by the losing paurty.4 Here, 
the district court awarded attorney fees and costs to the Browns 
and expressly noted that such an award remedied the costs 
incurred by the Browns as a result of HTC's lawsuit. Because 
HTCTs unsuccessful litigation was anticipated and its resulting 
costs remedied under the terms of the Lease, the district court 
4. In their appellate brief, the Browns characterize HTC's 
litigation as "frivolous." However, the Browns neither point to 
a district court finding that the suit was frivolous nor provide 
any substantive argument as to why we should treat it as such. 
Further, the Browns provide no argument as to why the payment of 
their attorney fees, as ordered by the district court, is not an 
adequate remedy for the bringing of frivolous, as well as merely 
unsuccessful, litigation. Accordingly, we do not address whether 
HTC's suit was frivolous or the effect, if any, if it was. 
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properly concluded that HTC's initiation of this action did not 
constitute a material breach of the Lease.5 
III. Attorney Fees 
Hl8 Both parties raise arguments as to the attorney fees awarded 
below, as well as the question of fees on appeal. We first 
address the district court's award of fees below, and we then 
turn to the question of fees on appeal. 
A. Attorney Fees Awarded Below 
[^19 HTC raises two arguments challenging the district court's 
award of attorney fees below. First, HTC argues that the 
affidavit the Browns submitted in support of their attorney fees 
request was insufficient to support an award of fees under rule 
73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 73. 
Second, HTC argues that the fee award "must be reduced 
proportionately to account for the degree of success the 
prevailing party has."6 
^20 Addressing HTC's proportionality argument first, we see no 
error in the district court's decision to award the Browns 
attorney fees for the entirety of the litigation below. Cf. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P,2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) 
("Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned in the 
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." (citation 
omitted)). As to HTC's claims pertaining to the Easement, the 
Browns clearly prevailed and are entitled to fees under the terms 
of the Lease. HTC characterizes itself as the prevailing party 
on the Browns' counterclaims because the district court dismissed 
5. The district court also concluded that HTC's actions were 
"not appropriate conduct" under the Lease and that the proper 
remedy for this inappropriate conduct was HTC' s payment of the 
Browns' attorney fees and costs. HTC does not challenge either 
of these conclusions, and we do not disturb them. 
6. The Browns cursorily imply in their reply brief that the 
district court inappropriately limited its award of attorney fees 
and costs to them. However, the Browns provide no reasoned 
argument as to what those limitations were or why they may have 
been inappropriate. Accordingly, we do not address this issue. 
See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, f 
46, 70 P.3d 904 (noting that we may decline to review an argument 
imposing the burden of argument and research on the court) ; see 
also Utah R. App. P. 24(c) (limiting reply briefs to answering 
any new matter set forth in the opposing brief) . 
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the Browns' unlawful detainer action and declined to find that 
HTC's actions constituted a material breach of the Lease. 
However, HTC does not challenge or address the district court's 
conclusion that HTC's actions were "not appropriate11 under the 
Lease and that those actions warranted a remedy in the form of 
paying the Browns their attorney fees and costs. These 
unchallenged conclusions by the district court, together with the 
Browns' complete success in defending against HTC's claims, 
clearly support the district court's decision that the Browns 
were the overall prevailing party below and are entitled to an 
award of reasonable attorney fees and costs under the terms of 
the Lease. 
^21 Although we affirm the district court's decision to award 
the Browns their attorney fees below, we nevertheless agree with 
HTC that the Brownsf affidavit evidencing the amount of those 
fees is insufficient to allow the district court to have 
determined the reasonableness of the claimed fees . See generally 
Utah R. Civ. P. 73; Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990 
(identifying questions to be answered under rule 73, including 
the total work performed, the necessity of the work, and the 
reasonableness of counsel's hourly rate); EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. 
Klibanoff, 2008 UT App 284, fl 17, 192 P.3d 296 (holding affidavit 
adequate where it "substantially answer [ed] " the qxiestions 
identified in Dixie State Bank) . Although the Browns' affidavit 
generally listed a number of services provided by their attorneys 
and identified each attorney's hourly rate, there was no 
breakdown as to which attorney performed which services, the 
hours spent on each service, or even the total number of hours 
expended on the litigation. The Browns1 affidavit fails to 
substantially answer the questions identified in Dixie State Bank 
v. Bracken, 764 P,2d 985 (Utah 1988), and we accordingly reverse 
the district court's order determining the amount of the fee and 
cost award and remand this issue for further consideration. 
B. Attorney Fees on Appeal 
1(22 Both parties also request attorney fees incurred on appeal 
to the extent that today's opinion renders them successful 
parties below and on appeal. See generally Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) ("[W]hen a party who 
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is 
also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). For the reasons expressed herein, we 
award reasonable attorney fees only to the Browns, and only for 
fees incurred as the appellee and not as the cross-appellant. 
1|23 We first note that there may be situations where an appeal 
and cross-appeal raise such interrelated issues that it is proper 
to evaluate prevailing party status based on the overall result 
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of the appeal and cross-appeal. See, e-g., Stonecreek 
Landscaping, LLC v. Bell, 2008 UT App 144U, para. 15 (raera.) 
(determining, where the parties raised related issues on appeal 
and cross-appeal, that there was no prevailing party in light of 
the appellate court's "across the board" affirmance of the trial 
court). This is not the case here, where the appeal and cross-
appeal address different issues arising from entirely different 
claims below. Accordingly, we treat the appeal and cross-appeal 
separately for purposes of determining the partiesf entitlement 
to attorney fees on appeal. Cf. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 
UT 4, H 32, 998 P.2d 254 (awarding fees to a prevailing appellee 
in part but denying fees incurred by the appellee in pursuing an 
unsuccessful motion to dismiss) . 
^24 As to the issues raised in HTCrs appeal, we award reasonable 
appellate attorney fees to the Browns. The district court 
awarded fees to the Browns on HTC's failed claims, and the Browns 
have substantially prevailed against HTC's appeal of those 
claims. Accordingly, despite our remand for further 
consideration of the amount of the Browns' attorney fees award 
below, the Browns are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney 
fees incurred in defending against HTC's appeal. Cf. id. 
(awarding statutorily allowed attorney fees to ,?a party which 
successfully defends an appeal"); Pack v. Caser 2001 UT App 232, 
fl 39-41, 30 P.3d 436 (awarding attorney fees to appellee who 
"prevailed on the majority of issues on appeal, including the 
most substantial issue"). 
<f25 As to the separate and independent issues raised in the 
Browns' cross-appeal, we determine that neither party is entitled 
to an award of attorney fees. The Browns are not entitled to an 
award of fees because, although they were awarded fees below,7 
they have not prevailed on their cross-appeal. See Valcarce, 961 
P. 2d at 319; see also ProMax Dev, Corp, , 2000 UT 4, f 32 (denying 
fees for unsuccessful motion to dismiss despite award of fees for 
prevailing on remainder of appeal) . Conversely, HTC is not 
entitled to an award of fees for successfully defending against 
the Browns1 cross-appeal because HTC did not "receive [] attorney 
fees below" on the Browns1 counterclaims, see Valcarce, 961 P. 2d 
at 319, and, as explained above, we have affirmed the district 
7. We further note that, to the extent the district court 
awarded the Browns attorney fees as breach of contract damages 
rather than under the Lease's fee provision, the Browns provide 
no authority for the proposition that such damages constitute 
"receiv[ing] attorney fees below" for purposes of an award of 
fees on appeal. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 
(Utah 1998). We need not address this issue today in light of 
the Browns1 lack of success in prosecuting their cross-appeal. 
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court's award of fees to the Browns below. An award of fees on 
appeal requires both a fee aiward below and success in the 
appellate court. See id. Because neither party completely 
satisfies the test for an award of attorney fees arising out of 
the Browns' cross-appeal, neither party is entitled to an award 
of such fees. 
CONCLUSION 
f2G We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed both 
HTC's claims and the Browns1 counterclaim for unlawful detainer 
and properly determined that HTC had not materially breached the 
Lease. Thus, we affirm the district court on those issues. We 
also affirm the district court's decision to award attorney fees 
to the Browns below, but we reverse the district court's 
determination of the amount of those fees due to the 
insufficiency of the Browns1 rule 73 affidavit. Finally, we 
award the Browns their reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
successfully defending against HTC's appeal but decline to award 
fees to either party in regards to the Browns1 cross-appeal. The 
matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
William A' Thome Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
-7 
f27 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
=irolyriUB. McHugh, JudgeC-^ Carol 
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Holladay Towne Center, LLC, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Brown Family Holdings, LCr 
Defendant and Respondent. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon the State's Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, filed on January 20, 2009. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, that the States' Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is granted as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the lease 
at issue in this case encompassed any subsequently-
discovered potential encumbrances and assigned the 
responsibility for legally resolving them to the tenant 
Petitioner. 
2. Whether a lease may confer legal standing on a tenant to 
litigate property rights originally possessed by a landlord. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
FOR THE COURT: 
V~%3-^ 
Date Matthew £7 Durrant,V 
Associate Chief Justice 
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THIS GROUND LEASE (this "Lease"), dated as of Match 1,2005 (the 
"Effective Date"), is made by and between the BROWN FAMILY HOLDINGS,, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company ("Landlord"), and HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, L L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company ("Tenant"), with respect to the following facts: 
RECITALS 
A. Landlord is the fee owner of that certain real property situated in the City 
of Holladay, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which real property is legally described on Exhibit 
"A" attached heieto, together with all rights and interest, if any, of Landlord in and to the land 
lying in the streets and roads in front thereof and adjoining thereto and in and to any easements oi 
other lights appurtenant thereto (the "Landlord Property" or "Land"). 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, and the 
representations, warranties, covenants and conditions contained herein and for other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, Landlord 
and Tenant agree as follows: 
DEFINITIONS 
As used in this Lease, the following capitalized terms shall have the meanings set 
forth below: 
"Affiliate" means any Person which (1) directly or indirectly through one or more 
intermediaries controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the Tenant or 
Landlord or (2) owns twenty-five percent (25%) or more of the equity interest of which is held 
beneficially or of record by the Tenant or Landlord, as the context may require. "Control" means 
the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to cause the direction of the management and 
policies of a Person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, family 
relationship or otherwise. 
"Anniversary Date" means the date exactly one (1) year after the date on which 
an event occurred in a previous calendar year. 
"CPI" means the increase in the Consumer Price Index from the same date in the 
preceding year. 
"Commencement Date" is the first day of the first full month beginning after the 
Effective Date. 
. K 
"Default Rate" means two percentage points in excess of the "Prime Rate1'. The 
interest rate ascertained as the Default Rate under this Agreement shall change as often as, and 
when, the Prime Rate changes or changes in the law occur, as the case may be. 
"Effective Date" means the date first written above, which is the effective date 
upon which each party has caused to be delivered to the other party this Lease, Landlord's 
exclusive right to use the Premises has terminated and the Landlord has actually vacated the 
Premises. 
"Hazardous Substances" means any hazardous or toxic substances, materials or 
wastes, including, but not limited to, those substances, materials, and wastes listed in the United 
States Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Table (49 CFR 172.101) or by the 
Enviionmental Protection Agency as hazardous substances (40 CFR Part 302); Hazardous 
Chemicals as defined in the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard; Hazardous Substances as 
defined in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C § 9601, e t seg.; Hazardous Substances as defined in the Toxic Substances Contiol Act, 
15 U.S.C, § 26012671; and all substances now or hereafter designated as "hazardous substances," 
"hazardous materials" or "toxic substances" under any other federal, state or local laws or in any 
regulations adopted and publications promulgated pursuant to said laws, and amendments to all 
such laws and regulations thereto, or such substances, materials, and wastes which are or become 
regulated under any applicable local, state or federal law. 
"Imposition" means all taxes (including possessory interest, leal property, ad 
valorem, and personal property taxes), assessments, charges, license fees, municipal liens, levies, 
excise taxes, impact fees, or imposts, whether general or special, ordinary or extraordinary 
imposed by any governmental or quasi-governmental authority pursuant to law directly as a result 
of Tenant's leasehold ownership of the Premises or ownership of the Improvements located 
thereon which may be levied, assessed, charged or imposed, or may be or become a lien or 
charge upon the Premises, or any part thereof, or upon the leasehold estate hereby created. 
"Improvements" means any structures hereafter constructed on and affixed to the 
Land. 
"Indebtedness" means the amount which is outstanding at any given time under a 
Permitted Mortgage. 
"Indemnified Parties" means either the Landlord Indemnified Parties or the 
Tenant Indemnified Parties, as applicable; an "Indemnified Party" means any individual within 
either such group, as applicable. 
"Insurance Proceeds" means any amount received by Tenant from an insurance 
carrier, after deducting therefrom the reasonable fees and expenses of collection, including but 
not limited to reasonable attorneys' fees and experts' fees. 
"Landlord's Estate" means all of Landlord's right, title, and interest in its fee 
estate in the Premises, its reversionary interest in the Improvements pursuant hereto, and all other 
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Rent and benefits due Landlord hereunder. 
"Lease Expiration Date" means the earlier to occur of the following dates: 
(a) that date which is twenty (20) years following the Commencement Date or (b) that date upon 
which this Lease is sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions of this Lease or the mutual 
agreement of the parties hereto. 
"Leased Property" means the Landlord Property that is leased by the Tenant as 
legally described in the attached Exhibit "A". 
"Legal Requirements" means all present and future laws, statutes, requirements, 
ordinances, orders, judgments, regulations, administrative or judicial determinations, even if 
unforeseen or extraordinary, of every governmental or quasi-governmental authority, court or 
agency claiming jurisdiction over the Premises now or hereafter enacted or in effect (including, 
but not limited to, Environmental Laws and those relating to accessibility to, usability by, and 
discrimination against, disabled individuals), and all covenants, restrictions, and conditions now 
or hereafter of record which may be applicable to Tenant or to all or any portion of the Premises, 
or to the use, occupancy, possession, operation, maintenance, alteration, repair or restoration of 
any of the Premises, even if compliance therewith necessitates structural changes to the 
Improvements or the making of Improvements, or results in interference with the use or 
enjoyment of all or any portion of the Premises. 
"Mortgagee" means any one or more holders of the beneficial interest and 
secured position under any Permitted Mortgage. 
''Official Records11 means the Official Records of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
"Partial Taking" is defined in Section 11.2. 
"Permitted Exceptions" means those matters described in Exhibit "B" attached 
hereto affecting Landlord's title to the Land all of which have been approved by Tenant. 
"Permitted Mortgage" means collectively (a) any deed(s) of trust and other 
collateral security instruments (including, without limitation, financing statements, security 
agreements and other documentation required pursuant to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
and any absolute or conditional assignments of rents and subleases) serving as security for one or 
more construction loans and/or permanent loans (otherwise permitted to be incurred hereunder) 
which encumber Tenant's Estate, together with any modification, substitution, amendment, 
extension, increase, refinancing, replacement or recasting (otherwise permitted to be incurred 
hereunder) thereof and (b) any instruments required in connection with an assignment-
subleaseback transaction involving Tenant's Estate; provided, however, in no event shall any 
such Permitted Mortgage encumber Landlord's Estate. 
"Premises" shall mean the Leased Property and the Improvements now or 
hereafter located thereon. 
Q 
"Prime Rate" means the Key Bank Reference Rate as announced from time to 
time, 01 if theie is no Key Bank Reference Rate, then the Prime Rate shall be the prime rate 
announced from time to time by the banking institution in the State of Utah having the greatest 
dollai volume of deposits. 
"Purchase Option" is defined in Article 16. 
"Rent" means all sums due and payable to Landlord by Tenant hereunder. 
"Sublease" means any present or future ground sublease, space sublease, use, or 
occupancy agieement, entered into in accordance with Article 14 below, and any modification, 
extension or termination of any of the foregoing entered into in accordance with Article 14 
below. Subleases shall also include any ground lease, space lease, use or occupancy agreement 
between Tenant, as lessor thereunder, and a lessee, the demised premises under which are 
partially situated within the Premises and partially situated within other portions of Tenant's 
Project. 
"Subtenant" means any person or entity entitled to the use of all or any portion of 
the Piemises under any Sublease. Subtenants shall also include each lessee under any ground 
lease, space lease, use or occupancy agreement between Tenant, as lessor thereunder, and such 
lessee, the demised premises under which are partially situated within the Premises and partially 
situated within other portions of Tenant's Project. 
"Tenant's Estate" means all of Tenant's right, title and interest in its leasehold 
estate in the Premises, its fee estate in the Improvements, and its interest under this Lease. 
"Tenant's Project" means the Leased Property and any adjacent land and 
improvements owned or controlled by Tenant 
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ARTICLE 1: DEMISE OF PREMISES 
1.1 Demise. Landlord hereby leases to Tenant the Premises, together with all 
rights, privileges, easements, and appurtenances belonging to or in any way appertaining thereto, 
including but not limited to, any and all surface easements, rights, titles, and privileges of 
Landlord now or hereafter existing in and to adjacent streets, sidewalks and alleys for the Term, 
at the rental, and upon all of the covenants and conditions set forth herein. 
Concurrently with the Effective Date, Landlord has delivered possession of the 
Premises to Tenant, subject to the following matters to the extent that they affect the Premises: 
(a) The Permitted Exceptions to the extent valid and subsisting and affecting the 
Premises as of the Effective Date; 
(b) The effect of all present building restrictions and regulations and present and 
future zoning laws, ordinances, resolutions, and regulations of the City of Sandy (the "City1') 
which are of general application in the City and the County of Salt Lake and all present 
ordinances, regulations and orders of all boards, bureaus, commissions and bodies of the City 
(which are of general application in the City) and any county, state or federal agency, now 
having, or hereafter having acquired, jurisdiction of the Premises and the use and improvement 
thereof; 
(c) The condition and state of repair of the Premises on the Effective Date; 
(d) All taxes, duties, assessments, special assessments, water charges and sewer 
rents, and any other Impositions, accrued or unaccrued, fixed or not fixed, prorated as hereinafter 
more fully provided; and 
(e) Present violations of law, ordinances, orders or requirements that might be 
disclosed by an examination and inspection or search of the Premises by any federal, state, 
county or municipal department or authority having jurisdiction, as the same may exist on the 
Effective Date. 
L2 Memorandum of Lease. This Lease shall not be recorded; however, to 
establish the status of Tenant's title, to establish the priority of this Lease as a condition of title, 
Landlord and Tenant agree to execute and acknowledge a short form Memorandum of this Lease 
which Tenant may record in the Official Records on or after the Effective Date. In the event of a 
discrepancy between the provisions of such Memorandum and this Lease, the provisions of this 
Lease shall prevail. Recordation of such Memoranda shall be at the expense of Tenant. 
ARTICLE 2: TERM 
2.1 Term. The teim of this Lease shall commence on the Commencement 
Date and shall expire on the date which is (20) years after the Commencement Date, unless 
sooner terminated . 
ARTICLE 3: RENT. 
3.1 Payment of Rent. Tenant shall pay Rent during the term of this Ground 
Lease to Landlord as follows: 
(a) Annual Rent. As annual rent ("Annual Rent") the sum of $58,200.00, payable 
in advance in equal monthly installments of $4,850.00 beginning on the first day of the calendar 
month after the Commencement Date and thereafter on he first day of each calendar month and is 
subject to adjustment as provided in subsection (b) below. This is a triple net lease, tenant 
agrees that the amount of annual rent will be paid without offset and that tenant will pay all 
impositions and costs relating to the property so that the Landlord has no cost or expense relating 
to the property during the term or any extension of the lease. 
(b) Adjustment to Annual Rent. On the sixth (6th) anniversary of the 
Commencement Date, the Annual Rent shall be increased to $64,200.00 payable in monthly 
installments of $5,350.00. On the eleventh (11th) anniversary of the Commencement Date, the 
Annual Rent shall be increased to $70,800.00 payable in monthly installments of $5,900.00. On 
the sixteenth (16lh) anniversary of the commencement Date, the Annual Rent shall be increased 
to $78,060.00 payable in monthly installments of $6,505.00.. 
3.2 Manner of Payment. Rent to be paid to Landlord shall be paid in legal 
tender for the payment of public and private debts to Landlord at such address as Landlord may 
from time to time designate in writing. For any period of less than a full month, quarter or year 
for which Rent is payable, the applicable Rent shall be prorated. 
ARTICLE 4: PAYMENT OF TAXES AND OTHER CHARGES 
4.1 Payment of Impositions. Commencing on the Effective Date and 
continuing for the entire Initial Term and the Primary Term (collectively, the "Term") of this 
Lease and any extension thereof, Tenant covenants and agrees (except as specifically otherwise 
provided in Sections 4.2 and 4 4 below) to pay and discharge or cause to be paid and discharged 
all Impositions promptly before delinquency and before any fine, interest or penalty shall be 
assessed by reason of its nonpayment. If, at any time during the Term or any extension thereof 
the methods of taxation prevailing at the Effective Date shall be so altered so that in lieu of any 
Imposition described in this Section 4.1 there shall be levied, assessed or imposed an alternate 
tax, however designated, such alternate tax shall be deemed an Imposition for the purpose of this 
Article and Tenant shall pay and discharge such Imposition as provided by this Article. If the 
Effective Date is a day other than the first day of a "tax" or "fiscal" year, i.e., luly 1 (a "Tax 
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Year"), a]] such Impositions shall be prorated such that Tenant shall be responsible only for 
those Impositions payable in connection with the Premises following the Effective Date, such 
pro-ration to be based on the ratio that the number of days in such fractional Tax Year bears to 
365. Payment of Impositions with respect to the final Tax Year within the Term shall be 
. similarly prorated. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if prior to the Effective Date or after the 
expiration or earlier termination of this Lease, any Imposition is not payable with respect to the 
Premises because Tenant is exempt under applicable law from paying such Imposition, then such 
Imposition shall not be prorated, and Tenant shall be responsible for 100% of such Imposition 
attributable to the period following the Effective Date or prior to the expiration or earlier 
termination of this Lease, as the case may be. 
4.2 Contesting Impositions, In the event that Tenant shall desire to contest or 
otherwise review by appropriate legal or administrative proceeding any Imposition, Tenant shall 
give Landlord written notice of its intention to so contest same; after giving such notice to 
Landlord, Tenant shall not be in default hereunder by reason of the non-payment of such 
Imposition if Tenant shall have (a) obtained and furnished to the applicable taxing authority 
(other than Landlord) a bond or other security to the extent required by applicable law, and (b) 
established reserves reasonably sufficient to pay such contested Imposition and the penalties and 
interest that may be reasonably payable in connection therewith. Any such contest or other 
proceeding shall be conducted solely at Tenant's expense and free of expense toLandlord. 
Tenant shall pay the amount so determined to be due, together with all costs, expenses, interest, 
and penalties related thereto. 
4.3 Utilities. All water, gas, electricity, or other public utilities used upon or 
furnished to the Premises during the Term hereof shall be promptly paid by Tenant as billed and 
prior to delinquency. 
4.4 Payment by Landlord. Unless Tenant is contesting any Impositions as 
provided in Section 4.2 above, Landlord may, at any time after the date any Imposition is 
delinquent, give written notice to Tenant specifying same, and if Tenant continues to fail to pay 
or contest such Imposition, then at any time after ten (10) days from Tenant's receipt of such 
written notice, Landlord may pay the Imposition specified in said notice. Tenant covenants to 
reimburse and pay Landlord any amount so paid or expended in the payment of such Imposition 
upon demand therefor, with interest thereon at the Default Rate from the date of such payment by 
Landlord until repaid byTenant. 
ARTICLE 5: ENCUMBRANCE OF TENANT'S ESTATE; MORTGAGEE 
PROTECTION 
5.1 Encumbrance of Tenant's Estate. Tenant shall have the right to encumber 
Tenant's Estate or any portion thereof or interest therein or any Sublease pursuant to one or more 
Permitted Mortgages, provided Tenant shall refrain from encumbering or purporting to 
encumber, by means of a Permitted Mortgage or otherwise any portion of the Landlord Property 
other than Tenant's interest in easements and covenants. Tenant shall, promptly following its 
receipt of any notice of default or other notice of the acceleration of the maturity of a Permitted 
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Mortgage from a Mortgagee, deliver a true and correct copy thereof to Landlord. 
5.2 Mortgagee Protections. Provided that any Mortgagee provides Landlord 
with a conformed copy of each Permitted Mortgage which contains the name and address of such 
Mortgagee, and provided such Permitted Mortgage was executed in compliance with the terms 
hereof, Landlord hereby covenants and agrees to faithfully perform and comply with the 
following provisions with respect to such Permitted Mortgage: 
(a) No Termination, No action by Tenant or Landlord to cancel, surrender, 01 
materially modify the terms of this Lease or the provisions of this Article 5 shall be binding upon 
a Mortgagee without its prior written consent. 
(b) Notices. If Landlord shall give any notice, demand, election or other 
communication which may adversely affect the security for a Permitted Mortgage, including 
without limitation a notice of an Event of Default hereunder (hereinafter collectively "Notices") 
to Tenant, Landlord shall simultaneously give a copy of each such Notice to the Mortgagee at the 
address theretofore designated by it. Such copies of Notices shall be sent by Landlord and 
deemed received as described in Article 17 below. No Notice given by Landlord to Tenant shall 
be binding upon or affect said Mortgagee unless a copy of said Notice shall be given to 
Mortgagee pursuant to this Section. In the case of an assignment of such Permitted Mortgage or 
change in address of such Mortgagee, said assignee or Mortgagee, by written notice to Landlord, 
may change the address to which such copies of Notices are to be sent. Landlord shall not be 
bound to recognize any assignment of such Permitted Mortgage unless and until Landlord shall 
be given written notice thereof, a copy of the executed assignment, and the name and address of 
the assignee. Thereafter, such assignee shall be deemed to be the Mortgagee hereunder with 
respect to the Permitted Mortgage being assigned. 
(c) Performance of Covenants. The Mortgagee shall have the right to perform 
any term, covenant or condition and to remedy any default by Tenant hereunder within the time 
periods specified herein, and Landlord shall accept such performance with the same force and 
effect as if furnished by Tenant; provided, however, that said Mortgagee shall not thereby or 
hereby be subrogated to the rights of Landlord. 
(d) Delegation to Mortgagee. Tenant may delegate irrevocably to the Mortgagee 
the non-exclusive authority to exercise any or all of Tenant's rights hereunder, but no such 
delegation shall be binding upon Landlord unless and until either Tenant or the Mortgagee shall 
give to Landlord a true copy of a written instrument effecting such delegation. Such delegation 
of authority may be effected by the terms of the Permitted Mortgage itself, in which case service 
upon Landlord of an executed counterpart or conformed copy of said Permitted Mortgage in 
accordance with this Article 5, together with written notice specifying the provisions therein 
which delegate such authority to said Mortgagee, shall be sufficient to give Landlord notice of 
such delegation. 
(e) Default by Tenant. In the event of an Event of Default by Tenant in the 
payment of any monetary obligation hereunder, Landlord agrees not to terminate this Lease 
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unless and until Landlord provides written notice of such Event of Default to any Mortgagee and 
such Mortgagee shall have failed to cure such Event of Default within thirty (30) business days 
following delivery of such notice. In the event of an Event of Default by Tenant in the 
performance or observance of any non-monetary term, covenant, or condition to be performed by 
it hereunder, Landlord agrees not to terminate this Lease unless and until Landlord provides 
written notice of such Event of Default to any Mortgagee and such Mortgagee shall have failed to 
cure such Event of Default within thirty (30)days following the expiration of any grace or cure 
periods granted Tenant herein; provided, however, if such Event of Default cannot practicably be 
cured by the Mortgagee without taking possession of the Premises, or if such Event of Default is 
not susceptible of being cured by the Mortgagee, then Landlord shall not terminate this Lease if 
and as long as: 
(i) In the case of an Event of Default which cannot practicably be 
cuied by the Mortgagee without taking possession of the Premises, the Mortgagee has delivered 
to Landlord, prior to the date on which Landlord shall be entitled to give notice of lease 
termination, a written undertaking wherein the Mortgagee agrees that it will cure such Event of 
Default; 
(ii) In the case of an Event of Default which cannot practicably be 
cured by the Mortgagee without taking possession of the Premises, said Mortgagee shall proceed 
diligently to obtain possession of the Premises as Mortgagee (including possession by receiver), 
and, upon obtaining such possession, shall proceed diligently to cure such Event of Default in 
accordance with the undertaking delivered pursuant to Subsection (i) above but in no event later 
than 180 days after obtaining possession; and 
(iii) In the case of an Event of Default which is not susceptible to being 
cured by the Mortgagee (for example, the insolvency of Tenant), the Mortgagee shall institute 
foreclosure proceedings and diligently prosecute the same to completion (unless in the meantime 
it shall acquire Tenant's Estate hereunder, either in its own name or through a nominee, by 
assignment in lieu of foreclosure) and, upon such completion of foreclosure or acquisition, such 
Event of Default shall be deemed to have been cured. 
The Mortgagee shall not be required to obtain possession or to continue in possession as 
Mortgagee of the Premises pursuant to Subsection (ii) above, or to continue to prosecute 
foreclosure proceedings pursuant to Subsection (iii) above, if and when such Event of Default 
shall be cured. Nothing herein shall preclude Landlord from exercising any of its rights or 
remedies with respect to any other Event of Default by Tenant during any period of such 
forbearance, but in such event the Mortgagee shall have all of its rights provided for herein. If 
the Mortgagee, its nominee, or a purchaser in a foreclosure sale, shall acquire title to Tenant's 
Estate hereunder and shall cure all Events of Default which are susceptible of being cured by the 
Mortgagee or by said purchaser, as the case may be, then prior Events of Default which are not 
susceptible to being cured by the Mortgagee or by said purchaser shall no longer be deemed 
Events of Default hereunder. 
(f) Foreclosure. Foreclosure of any Permitted Mortgage, or any sale thereunder, 
whether by judicial proceedings or by virtue of any power contained in the Permitted Mortgage, 
or any conveyance of the leasehold estate hereunder from Tenant to any Mortgagee or its 
Q 
designee through, or in lieu of, foreclosure or other appropriate proceedings in the nature thereof, 
shall not lequire the consent of Landlord or constitute a breach of any provision of or a default 
under this Lease, and upon such foreclosure, sale or conveyance Landlord shall recognize the 
Mortgagee or such designee as the Tenant hereunder. If any Mortgagee or other third party shall 
acquire Tenant's Estate as a result of a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure under any Permitted 
Mortgage, or by means of a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or through settlement of or arising out of 
any pending or contemplated foreclosure action, such Mortgagee or such other third party 
purchaser shall thereafter have the right to further assign or transfer Tenant's Estate to an 
assignee upon obtaining Landlord's consent with respect thereto, which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld or delayed, and subject to all of the other provisions of Article 15 below. 
Upon such acquisition of Tenant's Estate as described in the preceding sentence by Mortgagee or 
its designee, Landlord shall immediately execute and deliver a new ground lease of the Premises 
to such Mortgagee, upon the written request therefor by such Mortgagee given not later than one 
hundred twenty (120) days after such party's acquisition of the Tenant's Estate. Such new ground 
lease shall be substantially similar in form and content to the provisions of this Lease, except 
with respect to the parties thereto, the term thereof (which shall be co-extensive with the 
remaining term hereof), and the elimination of any requirements which have been fulfilled by 
Tenant prior thereto, and such new ground lease shall have priority equal to the priority of this 
Lease. Upon execution and delivery of such new ground lease, Landlord shall cooperate with the 
new Tenant, at the sole expense of said new Tenant, in taking such action as may be necessary to 
cancel and discharge this Lease and to remove Tenant named herein from the Premises. 
(g) Mortgagee Loss Payable. Landlord agrees that the names of each Mortgagee 
shall be added to the "Loss Payable Endorsement" of any and all insurance policies required to be 
earned by Tenant under this Lease on condition that the insurance proceeds are to be applied in 
the manner specified herein. 
(h) New Lease. Landlord agrees that in the event of termination of this Lease by 
reason of any Event of Default by Tenant, or by reason of the disaffirmance hereof by a receiver, 
liquidator or trustee for Tenant or its property, Landlord will enter into a new lease of the 
Premises with the most senior Mortgagee requesting a new lease for the remainder of the Lease 
Term, effective as of the date of such termination, at the rent, and upon the terms, provisions, 
covenants and agreements as herein contained and subject to the rights, if any, of any parties then 
in possession of any part of the Premises, provided: 
(i) Mortgagee agrees to pay Landlord's reasonable attorney fees in 
connection with such new lease. 
(i) The senior Mortgagee shall make written request upon Landlord 
for the new lease within sixty (60) days after the date of termination: 
(ii) The senior Mortgagee shall pay to Landlord at the time of the 
execution and delivery of the new lease any and all sums which would, at the time of the 
execution and delivery thereof, be due and unpaid pursuant to this Lease but for its termination, 
and in addition thereto any expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to which Landlord 
shall have been subjected by reason of the Event of Default; 
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(iii) The senior Mortgagee shall perform and observe all covenants 
herein contained on Tenant's part to be performed which are susceptible to being performed by 
the senior Mortgagee, and shall further remedy any other conditions which Tenant under the 
terminated Lease was obligated to perform under its terms, to the extent the same are curable or 
may be performed by the senior Mortgagee; and 
(iv) The tenant under the new lease shall have the same right, title and 
interest in and to all improvements located on the Premises as Tenant had under the terminated 
Lease immediately prior to its termination. 
(v) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary expressed or implied 
elsewhere in this Lease, any new lease made pursuant to this Section 5.2 (h), shall be prior to any 
Permitted Mortgage or other lien, charge or encumbrance on the Premises, to the same extent as 
the terminated Lease, and shall be accompanied by a conveyance of title to the existing 
improvements (free of any mortgage, deed of trust, lien, charge, or encumbrance created by 
Landlord) for a term of years equal to the term of the new lease, subject to the reversion in favor 
of Landlord upon expiration or sooner termination of the new lease. The rights granted any 
Mortgagee to a new lease shall survive any termination of this Lease. 
(vi) If a Mortgagee shall elect to demand a new lease under this 
Section 5.2(h), Landlord agrees, at the request of, on behalf of and at the sole cost and expense of 
the Mortgagee, to institute and pursue diligently to conclusion any appropriate legal remedy or 
remedies to oust or remove the original Tenant from the Premises, and those Subtenants actually 
occupying the Premises, or any part thereof, as designated by the Mortgagee subject to any non-
disturbance or attornment agreements with such Subtenants. Such Mortgagee shall indemnify, 
defend and hold harmless Landlord for any losses, claims, costs and expenses (including, without 
limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees) arising out of Landlord's compliance with the provisions of 
this subparagraph (vi). 
(vii) Unless and until Landlord has received notice from all Mortgagees 
that the Mortgagees elect not to demand a new lease as provided in Section 5.2(h), or until the 
period therefore has expired, Landlord shall not cancel or agree to the termination or surrender of 
any existing Subleases nor enter into any new subleases hereunder without the prior written 
consent of the Mortgagee. 
(i) No Obligation to Cure. Nothing herein contained shall require any Mortgagee 
to enter into a new lease pursuant to Section 5.2(h) above, or to cure any default of Tenant 
referred to above. 
(j) No Personal Liability, In the event any Mortgagee or its designee becomes the 
Tenant under this Lease or under any new lease obtained pursuant to either Section 5.2(f) or 
5.2(h) above, the Mortgagee or its designee shall be personally liable for the obligations of 
Tenant under this Lease or a new lease, (k) Insurance Proceeds. The proceeds from any 
insurance policies or arising from a condemnation shall be paid to and held by the senior 
Mortgagee and distributed pursuant to the provisions of this Lease. 
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(!) Material Notices. The parties hereto shall give all Mortgagees notice of any 
arbitiation, litigation, or condemnation proceedings, or of any pending adjustment of insurance 
claims as each may relate to the Premises, and any Mortgagee shall have the right to intervene 
therein and shall be made a party to such proceedings. The parties hereto do hereby consent to 
such intervention. In the event that any Mortgagee shall not elect to intervene or become a party 
to the proceedings, such Mortgagee shall receive notice and a copy of any award or decision 
made in connection therewith. 
(m)Separate Agreement. Landlord shall, upon request, execute, acknowledge and 
deliver to each Mortgagee, an agreement prepared at the sole cost and expense of Tenant, in form 
satisfactory to each Mortgagee, between Landlord, Tenant and the Mortgagees, agreeing to all of 
the provisions hereof., provided that Tenant shall pay Landlord's reasonable attorney fees for 
review of any such agreement. 
(n) Further Amendments. Landlord hereby agrees to cooperate with Tenant in 
including in this Lease by suitable amendment from time to time any provision which Tenant 
may reasonably request as being from any proposed Mortgagee for the purpose of implementing 
the Mortgagee protection provisions contained in this Lease and allowing such Mortgagee 
reasonable means to protect or preserve the lien of the Permitted Mortgage, as well as such other 
documents containing terms and provisions customarily required by Mortgagees (taking into 
account the customary requirements of their participants, syndication partners or ratings 
agencies) in connection with any such financing. Landlord agrees to execute and deliver (and to 
acknowledge, if necessary, for recording purposes) any agreement necessary to effectuate any 
such amendment as well as such other documents containing terms and provisions customarily 
required by Lenders in connection with any such financing; provided, however, that any such 
amendment shall not in any way affect the term or Rent under this Lease, nor otherwise in any 
material respect adversely affect any rights of Landlord under this Lease. Tenant agrees to pay 
Landlord's reasonable attorney fees in connection with any such amendments or documents. 
ARTICLE 6: POSSESSION, USE, COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS, 
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS 
6.1 Possession. Tenant acknowledges that as of the Effective Date it shall 
accept possession of the Land. 
6.2 Use. Subject to the provisions of this Article 6, Tenant may use the 
Premises for a shopping center, retail store(s), office(s), or any other purpose permitted under 
•- Utah law'. Tenant may construct all the Improvements on the Land as part of Tenant's Project. 
6.3 Compliance With Laws. Subject to the provisions of Article 8 below, 
Tenant shall comply with all Legal Requirements in the use, occupation, control and enjoyment 
of the Premises and in the prosecution and conduct of its business thereon. Tenant shall have the 
right, at its own cost and expense, to contest or review by appropriate legal or administrative 
proceeding the validity or legality of any such Legal Requirement, and during such contest 
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Tenant may refrain from complying therewith provided that compliance therewith may legally be 
held in abeyance without subjecting Landlord to any liability, civil or criminal, of whatsoever 
nature for failure so to comply therewith and without the incurrence of a lien, charge or liability 
against the Premises or Landlord's Estate; and provided further that all such proceedings shall be 
prosecuted by Tenant with due diligence. 
6.4 Maintenance. Tenant shall, during the term hereof, keep and maintain the 
Premises in compliance with all Legal Requirements and all appurtenances thereto in good oider 
and repair, and shall allow no nuisance to exist or be maintained therein. Landlord shall not be 
obligated to make any repairs, replacements, or renewals of any kind, nature, or description 
whatsoever to the Premises. 
ARTICLE 7: CHANGES, ALTERATIONS AND NEW CONSTRUCTION 
7.1 Generally. Tenant shall have the right to alter, repair, restore, replace or 
reconstruct any of the Improvements located on the Land (which right shall necessarily include 
the right to demolish any of the Improvements), provided that all such work shall be performed 
by Tenant in compliance with this Article 7. 
7.2 Notice of Completion. Upon completion of any work of Improvement 
upon the Premises, Tenant shall file or cause to be filed, if required by applicable law, a valid 
Notice of Completion in a timely fashion. 
7.3 Title to Improvements. All Improvements constructed or installed upon 
the Premises by Tenant at any time prior to the Lease Expiration Date shall be and thereafter 
remain real property, and are and shall be the property of Tenant; provided, however, that upon 
the Lease Expiration Date, title to such Improvements shall vest in Landlord and the same shall 
become the property of Landlord. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this 
Section, Tenant hereby covenants and agrees to promptly execute and acknowledge (at no cost or 
expense to Tenant) a quitclaim deed or any other documentation reasonably required by Landlord 
to effectuate the provisions of this Section; Tenant's covenant to do so shall survive the Lease 
Expiration Date. 
ARTICLE 8: ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS 
8.1 Environmental Compliance. Commencing on the Effective Date, Tenant 
shall at all times comply with applicable Environmental Laws affecting the Premises. Tenant 
shall at its own expense maintain in effect any permits, license or other governmental approvals 
relating to Hazardous Substances, if any, required for Tenant's use, and cause each Subtenant to 
maintain in effect any such permits, license or other governmental approvals, if any, required for 
such Subtenant's use, of the Premises. Tenant shall make all disclosures required of Tenant by 
any such Environmental Laws, and shall comply with all orders, with respect to Tenant's and its 
employees', agents', contractors' and invitees' use of the Premises, issued by any governmental 
authority having jurisdiction over the Premises and take all action required by such governmental 
authorities to bring Tenant's and its employees', agents', contractors' and invitees' activities on the 
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Piemises into compliance with all Envnonmental Laws affecting the Piemises 
8 2 Notices If at any time Tenant or Landloid shall become awaie, 01 have 
leasonable cause to believe, that any actionable level of Hazaidous Substance has been idcascd 
01 has otheiwise come to be located on oi beneath the Piemises, such party shall immediately 
upon discoveung the lelease oi the piesence or suspected piesence of the Hazardous Substance, 
give written notice of that condition to the other paity In addition, the party fust learning of the 
release oi piesence of an actionable level of Hazaidous Substance on or beneath the Piemises, 
shall immediately notify the othei party in writing of (l) any enfoicement, cleanup, lemoval, oi 
othei governmental oi legulatoiy action instituted, completed, or threatened puisuant to any 
Envnonmental Laws, (n) any claim made oi thieatened by any peison against Landloid, Tenant 
oi the Piemises ansing out of or lesultmg fiom any actionable level of Hazaidous Substances, 
and (in) any reports made to any local, state, or fedeial envnonmental agency ansing out of oi in 
connection with any actionable level of Hazardous Substance 
8 3 Indemnity 
(a) By Landlord Landlord shall indemnify, defend (by c ounsel acceptable to 
Tenant), piotect, and hold harmless Tenant, Tenant's Affiliates and then lespective paitneis, 
membeis, shaieholdeis, tiustees, beneficiaues, officeis, dnectois, employees, attoineys, agents, 
hens, lepiesentatives, successors and assigns ("Tenant Indemnified Parties"), from any and all 
claims, liabilities, penalties, fines, judgments, foifeitmes, losses, costs, oi expenses (including 
leasonable attoineys', consultants', and expeit fees) (collectively, "Claims") arising fiom, lelated 
to, oi in connection with the death of or mjuiy to any person oi damage to any property 
whatsoever, arising fiom oi caused in whole or in part, dnectly oi indirectly, by the presence in, 
on, under, oi about the Land, or any discharge or release m or fiom the Land of any Hazaidous 
Substance, to the extent that any such presence, discharge, or release is caused by Landloid's 
activities oi the activities of any of Landloid's employees, agents, contiactois oi invitees pnoi to 
the Effective Date 
(b) Tenant Tenant shall indemnify, defend (by counsel acceptable to Landlord), 
piotect, and hold haimless Landlord, Landloid's Affiliates and then respective commissioners, 
dnectois, tiustees, beneficiaues, officers, paitners, membei, directois, employees, attoineys, 
agents, successois and assigns ("Landlord Indemnified Parties"), fiom and against any and all 
Claims ansing fiom, lelated to, oi in connection with the death of or injury to any peison oi 
damage to any property whatsoevei, ansing from or caused in whole or in pait, dnectly oi 
indiiectly, by (i) the piesence in, on, under, or about the Piemises oi any dischaige oi lelease in 
oi fiom the Piemises of any Hazaidous Substance, to the extent that any such piesence, 
discharge, oi lelease is caused by Tenant's activities, oi the activities of any of Tenant's 
Subtenants, employees, agents, contractors or invitees, oi (n) Tenant's failuie to comply with its 
covenants undei Section 8 1 and occurs aftei the Effective Date 
(c) Costs Included, Suivival The indemnity obligations cieated heieundei shall 
include, without limitation, whethei foieseeable or unforeseeable, any and all costs inclined m 
connection with any site investigation, and any and all costs foi repair, cleanup, detoxification oi 
decontamination, oi othei remedial action of the Piemises The obligations of the parties 
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hereunder shall survive the expiration or earlier termination of this Lease. 
ARTICLE 9: INSURANCE 
9.1 All Risk Insurance. Tenant, at its sole cost and expense, from the Effective 
Date forward shall throughout the entire Term keep the Insured Property insured against loss or 
damage by fire, windstorm, tornado, hail, water damage, lightning, vandalism and malicious 
mischief and against loss or damage by such other, further and additional risks as now are or 
hereafter may be embraced by the standard "all risk" forms or endorsements, and any coverage 
available under the so-called "installation floater", in each case in the full amount of the 
replacement value of the Insured Property and 100% of the replacement value of the rental 
receipts of the Insured Property on an actual loss-sustained basis (the "Full Insurable Value"). 
Likewise, any new Improvements constructed on the premises shall be insured as described 
above as of the Date of Substantial Completion. For purposes of the immediately preceding 
sentence, any building or structure and the Improvements related thereto or contained therein 
shall be deemed to be substantially completed when such building or structure and its related 
Improvements, taken as a whole, afe^ubstantially completed. 
9.2 Additional Insurance. Tenant, at its sole cost and expense, shall throughout 
the entire Term procure and maintain: 
(a) Liability Insurance. Liability insurance against claims for bodily injury, death 
or property damage occurring upon, in or about the Insured Property, including the public areas 
adjacent thereto, including, in a form no less than a commercial general liability policy, 
explosion, collapse and underground coverage, such insurance to afford immediate protection at 
the Effective Date for not less than $1,000,000 per occurrence/aggregate and $1,000,000 
complete operations per occurrence/aggregate. Such insurance shall, among other things, provide 
broad form contractual liability coverage (including without limitation indemnification or hold 
harmless obligations of Tenant under this Lease) and personal injury (including without 
limitation coverage for assault and battery not committed by or at the direction of the insured). 
Such insurance for the Insured Property shall also provide so-called "cross -liability" coverage for 
all of the insureds in respect of the employees of each insured. Landlord shall be named an 
additional insured under such policy. 
9.3 Builder's Risk Insurance. During the construction of any Improvements the 
insurance required by Section 9.1 shall, as to such Improvements which are part of the Insured 
Property, be in the form commonly known as "Builder's Risk" on an "all risk" basis including 
without limitation coverage against fire, lightning, wind damage, hail and collapse and coverage 
under the so-called "installation floater". The policy shall be secured and maintained by Tenant 
in a form and amount as may from time to time be determined by Tenant. Coverage shall include 
all materials, supplies and equipment that are intended for specific installation in the Insured 
Property while such materials, supplies and equipment are located in or on the Insured Property, 
in transit and while temporarily located away from the Insured Property for the purpose of repair, 
adjustment or storage at the risk of one of the insured parties. 
9.4 Named Insureds and Insurance Trustee. All policies of insurance required 
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undei Section 9 2 to be furnished undei this Lease shall include as named insuieds Landloid, 
Tenant, any Leasehold Moitgagee, Tenant's managers, and then respective officeis, dnectois, 
tiustees paitneis, employees ana agents, as then lespective interests may appeal All policies of 
msuiance lequned undei Sections 9 1 and 9 3 to be furnished under this Lease shall include as 
named insuieds Tenant, any Leasehold Moitgagee, Tenant's geneial paitneis, and then lespective 
ofticeis, dnectois, tiustees, partneis, employees and agents, as their lespective mteiests may 
appear, and Landloid as an additional insuied as its inteiest may appeal All such policies of 
insuiance shall piovide that the loss, if any, shall be payable to the Insuiance Tiustee, piovided 
that payments may be made directly to the third-party claimants under liability policies 
Piomptly upon the Insurance Trustee's leceipt of any payments undei any such policy, the 
Insuiance Tiustee shall (a) leimbuise Landloid, Tenant, any Leasehold Moitgagee and the 
Insuiance Tiustee foi their leasonable expenses incurred in the collection of the msuiance 
pioceeds and (b) pay to Landloid, Tenant and any Leasehold Moitgagee their lespective shaies of 
the pioceeds paid undei any such policy 
9 5 Insuiance in Geneial (a) Each policy of insurance requned under this 
Lease shall include provisions that the holdei of such policy shall not cancel oi teiminate such 
policy, oi cause such policy to expire, due to non-renewal by Tenant, and that coveiages under 
such policy shall not be materially reduced, unless at least 7 days notice of such pioposed 
expnation oi leduction has been piovided to all the insureds named in such policy by such 
holdei 
(b) To the extent allowed by Tenant's Lendeis, all pioceeds of such policies shall 
be used foi the restoration oi repair of the Insured Pioperty 
(c) Each policy of insuiance required under this Lease shall include a provision 
for a waivei of subrogation in favoi of Landlord, Tenant and all other insureds 
9 6 Copies to Landlord Upon the execution and dehveiy of this Lease and 
theieaftei not less than ten days piior to the expiration date of any insurance policy dehveied 
puisuant to this Aiticle, Tenant shall delivej to Landlord certified copies (oi ceitified extracts 
appioved by Landloid) of to be furnished hereunder all policies of insuiance lequned Pending 
issuance of such policies, Tenant may delivei to Landlord a commitment evidencing the 
coveiages lequired undei this Lease, piovided that Tenant shall replace such commitment with 
ceitified copies (oi extiacts, as peimitted herein) piior to the expiration date of such commitment 
9 7 Adjustment of Loss Any loss under any policy of insuiance lequned to be 
furnished undei this Lease shall be adjusted solely by Tenant 
9 8 Uneained Piemiums The unearned piemiums on all insuiance policies in 
foice at the end of the Teim which Landloid desnes to keep in effect shall be reimbuised by 
Landloid to Tenant and, upon such reimbursement, Tenant shall transfer to Landlord all of 
Tenant's inteiest in such insurance policies, unless a New Lease is enteied into by Landloid, in 
which case Tenant shall tiansfei to the new lessee undei such New Lease all of Tenant's inteiest 
m such insuiance policies 
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9.9 Blanket Insurance. Nothing in this Article shall prevent Tenant from 
taking out insurance of the kind and in the amounts provided for under this Article undei any 
blanket insurance policy which covers other properties owned or operated by Tenant or its 
Affiliates as well as the Insured Property, provided that any such policy of insurance (a) shall 
specify therein, or Tenant shall furnish Landlord with a written statement from the insurers under 
such policy specifying, the amount of the total insurance allocated to the Insured Property, which 
amount shall be not less than the amount required by this Article to be carried, and (b) shall not 
contain any clause which would result in the insured thereunder being required to carry insurance 
with respect to the Insured Property in an amount equal to a minimum specified percentage of the 
Full Insurable Value of such Insured Property in order to prevent the named insured therein from 
becoming a co-insurer of any loss with the insurer under such policy. Tenant shall furnish to 
Landlord, within 30 days after the filing thereof with any insurance ratemaking body, copies of 
the schedule or make-up of all property covered by any such policy of blanket insurance. 
9.10 Primary and Excess Coverages. Limits of liability for insurance required 
hereunder may be provided by primary insurance or a combination of both primary and excess 
insurance coverages. 
9.11 Insurance Non-Contributory. Neither Tenant nor Landlord shall carry 
separate insurance, concurrent in form and contributing, in the event of loss, for any insurance 
required under the provisions of this Article unless, in conformity with the requirements of this 
Article, all the named insureds listed in Section 9.4 are included therein as the named insureds. 
Tenant and Landlord shall each promptly notify of and deliver to the other each such separate 
insurance policy. 
ARTICLE 10: DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION 
10.1 Damage. If, during the Term, there occurs any material or substantial 
damage to or destruction of the Premises or any part thereof resulting from any cause whatsoever 
(except for any damage or destruction caused by Landlord, its invitees or permitees), Tenant shall 
give prompt notice thereof to Landlord and the Mortgagee, and Tenant shall take such action as 
is reasonably necessary to assure that neither the Premises nor the Improvements constitutes a 
nuisance or otherwise presents a health or safety hazard, such work to be accomplished at 
Tenant's sole cost and expense. The foregoing obligation shall not be contingent upon the 
availability of any Insurance Proceeds; however, Tenant shall be reimbursed out of the Insurance 
Proceeds for such work to the extent available. 
10.2 Cancellation. Tenant shall have the right, under any circumstance that 
would excuse the obligation of Tenant to restore the Premises, to terminate this Lease, by 
notifying Landlord within sixty (60) days after such date of damage or destruction. If the 
Premises shall be damaged so that Tenant reasonably determines that the cost would make 
restoration thereof unfeasible, notwithstanding the availability of Insurance Proceeds therefor, 
Tenant may terminate this Lease within sixty (60) days after such damage. Within 360 days after 
such termination. Tenant shall raze the then existing Improvements on the Land and clear the 
Land of debris and rubble. 
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10.3 Restoration. If this Lease is not terminated as provided in Section 10.2 
above, Tenant shall, subject to the terms of any Permitted Mortgage, proceed with the repair or 
restoration of the damaged Premises within ninety (90) days following such damage or 
destruction or, if greater than eighty percent (80%) of the estimated cost of such restoration is 
covered by insurance, then such later date as the Insurance Proceeds are available therefor, and 
once commenced such restoration shall be diligently prosecuted to completion. Landlord agrees 
to make available to Tenant any Insurance Proceeds (subject to the rights of any Mortgagee) 
payable to Landlord attributable and to be used for the restoration and repair of the Premises as 
herein provided. Landlord shall have no liability to Tenant, and Tenant shall not be entitled to 
terminate this Lease by virtue of any delays in completion of repairs and restoration, except to the 
extent caused by Landlord. 
10.4 Insurance Proceeds. All Insurance Proceeds shall be collected, held and 
disbursed in accordance with the terms of the applicable Permitted Mortgage. All Insurance 
Proceeds payable as a result of any damage or destruction which are to be used by Tenant for 
such repairs and restoration shall be payable to Tenant and used by Tenant to the extent necessary 
for payment of the cost of repairs and restoration required hereby. Any unused proceeds may be 
retained by Tenant (subject to the requirements of the applicable Permitted Mortgage). 
ARTICLE 11: EMINENT DOMAIN 
11.1 Substantial Taking. If forty percent (40%) or more of the Premises shall 
be taken for a public or quasi-public use by the exercise of the power of eminent domain or by 
purchase under threat of condemnation by any governmental agency, this Lease shall terminate in 
its entirety on the date the condemning authority actually consummates such taking of the 
Premises, and the Rent required to be paid by Tenant hereunder shall be appropriately prorated 
and paid to such date of taking or reduced as provided hereinbelow. In the event of any such 
taking, Landlord and Tenant shall together make one claim for an award for their combined 
interests in the Premises including an award for severance damages if less than the whole shall be 
so taken. The Condemnation Proceeds shall be distributed to Tenant (subject to the rights of the 
applicable Mortgagee under its Permitted Mortgage) to the extent that it is attributable to 
Tenant's Estate, or Tenant's personal property or the Improvements (or that of its invitees, agents 
or Subtenants) and to Landlord to the extent that it is attributable to the Landlord's Estate. 
11.2 Partial Taking. If less than forty percent (40%) of the Premises shall be 
taken for any public or quasi-public use under the power of eminent domain or by purchase under 
threat of condemnation by any governmental agency, or if any appurtenances of the Premises or 
any vaults or areas outside the boundaries of the Premises or rights in, under or above the streets 
adjoining the Premises or the rights and benefits of light, air or access from or to such streets, 
shall be so taken, or the grade of any such streets shall be changed, in any such case in a manner 
that the remaining portion of the Premises can be adapted and economically operated for the 
purposes and in substantially the same manner as it was operated prior thereto in Tenant's good 
faith business judgment, Tenant shall give prompt notice thereof to Landlord, this Lease shall 
continue in full force and effect and Base Rent shall be equitably abated. Tenant shall proceed, 
with reasonable diligence, to perform any necessary repairs arid to restore the Premises to an 
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economically viable unit in strict accordance with all Legal Requirements and the requirements 
of Article 7 above, and as nearly as possible to the condition the Premises was in immediately 
prior to such taking. The Condemnation Proceeds shall be paid to Tenant (subject to the rights of 
any Mortgagee) to the extent that it is attributable to Tenant's Estate, or Tenant's personal 
property or the Improvements (or that of its invitees, agents or Subtenants) and to Landlord to the 
extent that it is attributable to the Landlord's Estate. 
11.3 Temporary Taking. If the temporary use (but not leasehold title) of the 
whole or any part of the Premises shall be taken as aforesaid for less than ten (10) days in any 
calendar year, this Lease shall not be affected in any way and Tenant shall continue to pay all 
Rent due hereunder. All Condemnation Proceeds as a result of such temporary use shall be paid 
to Tenant. 
11.4 Proceedings. In any condemnation proceeding affecting the Premises 
which may affect Landlord's Estate and Tenant's Estate, both parties shall have the right to appear 
in and defend against such action as they deem proper in accordance with their own interests. To 
the extent possible, the parties shall cooperate to maximize the Condemnation Proceeds payable 
by reason of the condemnation. Issues between Landlord and Tenant required to be resolved 
pursuant to this Article shall be joined in any such condemnation proceeding to the extent 
permissible under then applicable procedural rules of such court of law or equity for the purpose 
of avoiding multiplicity of actions and minimizing the expenses of the parties. 
ARTICLE 12: DEFAULT 
12.1 Events of Default. A breach of this Lease by Tenant shall exist if any of 
the following events (individually an "Event of Default" and collectively "Events of Default") 
shall occur: 
(a) Tenant shall have failed to pay the Rent within fifteen (15) days of when due 
and such failure shall not have been cured within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice 
from Landlord respecting such overdue Rent payment; or 
(b) Tenant shall have failed to pay any other charge, or any obligation of Tenant 
requiring the payment of money under the terms of this Lease (other than the payment of Rent) 
within thirty (30) days of when due and such failure shall not have been cured within thirty (30) 
days after receipt of written notice from Landlord respecting such overdue payment; or 
(c) Tenant shall have failed to perform any term, covenant, or condition of this 
Lease to be performed by Tenant, except those requiring the payment of money, and Tenant shall 
have failed to cure same within thirty (30)days after written notice from Landlord, delivered in 
accordance with the provisions of this Lease, where such failure could reasonably be cured 
within said thirty (30) day period (subject to the occurrence of a Force Majeure Event); provided, 
however, that where such failure could not reasonably be cured within said thirty (30)day period, 
that Tenant shall not be in default unless it has failed to promptly commence and thereafter be 
continuing to make diligent and reasonable efforts to cure such failure as soon as practicable and 
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in no event later than one hundred eighty (180) days (subject to extension based on the 
occurrence of a Force Majeure Event as provided in Section 22.3). 
(d) Abandonment of the Premises, Improvements 01 of the leasehold estate, 
except in accoidance with Article 13 hereof; or 
(e) The subjection of any right or interest of Tenant under this Lease to 
attachment, execution, or other levy, or to seizure under legal process, if not released or 
appropriately bonded within ninety (90) days after receipt of written notice by Landlord; or 
(f) The appointment of a receiver to take possession of the Premises and/or 
Improvements or of Tenant's Estate or of Tenant's operations for any reason if not dischaiged 
within ninety (90) days of such appointment, including but not limited to, assignment for the 
benefit of creditors or voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, but not including 
receivership (i) pursuant to administration of the estate of any deceased or incompetent Tenant or 
of any deceased or incompetent individual partner of Tenant, or (ii) pursuant to a Permitted 
Mortgage, or (iii) instituted by Landlord, the event of default being not the appointment of a 
receiver at Landlord's instance but the event justifying the receivership, if any; or 
(g) An assignment by Tenant for the benefit of creditors or the filing of a 
voluntary or involuntary petition by or against Tenant under any law for the purpose of 
adjudicating Tenant as bankrupt; or for extending time for payment, adjustment or satisfaction of 
Tenant's liabilities to creditors generally; or for reorganization, dissolution, or arrangement on 
account of or to prevent bankruptcy or insolvency; unless the assignment or proceeding, and all 
consequent orders, adjudications, custodies, and supervisions are dismissed, vacated, or 
otherwise permanently stayed or terminated within ninety (90) days after the assignment, filing, 
or other initial event. 
12.2 Notice to Certain Persons. Landlord shall, before pursuing any remedy, 
give notice of any Event of Default to Tenant, to all Mortgagees whose names and mailing 
addresses were previously given to Landloid in the manner provided in this Lease. In addition, 
Landlord shall use its reasonable good faith efforts to give such notice to all Subtenants who 
have requested the same. Each notice of an Event of Default shall specify the Event of Default 
and shall describe any damage resulting from any such act. 
12.3 Landlord's Remedies. If any Event of Default by Tenant shall continue 
uncured, following notice of default as required by this Lease, for the period applicable to the 
default under the applicable provision of this Lease, subject to the rights of any Mortgagee under 
Article 5 hereof, Landlord shall have the following remedy in addition to all other rights and 
remedies provided by law or equity, to which Landlord may resort cumulatively or in the 
alternative: 
(a) Termination. If Landlord elects to terminate this Lease, then it shall give 
Tenant written notice of such termination and all of Tenant's rights in the Premises and in the 
Improvements shall terminate upon its receipt of such notice. Promptly after notice of 
termination, Tenant shall surrender and vacate the Premises and the Improvements in broom-
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clean condition, and Landlord may reenter and take possession of the Premises and the 
Improvements and eject all parties in possession or eject some and not others or eject none; 
provided that no Subtenant provided with a Nondisturbance Agreement shall be ejected and 
piovided Landlord shall not eject a Mortgagee in possession that is then in compliance with the 
provisions of this Lease. Termination shall not relieve Tenant from the payment of any sums due 
to Landlord hereunder plus interest thereon from the date due at the Default Rate, or from any 
claim for damages previously accrued or then accruing against Tenant up to the date of 
termination. 
12.4 Cumulative Remedies. The remedies given to Landlord herein shall not be 
exclusive but shall be cumulative with and in addition to all remedies now or hereafter allowed 
by law and elsewhere provided in this Lease. 
12.5 Waiver of Breach. No waiver by a party of any default by the other shall 
constitute a waiver of any other breach or default by the other, whether of the same or any other 
covenant or condition. No waiver, benefit, privilege, or service voluntarily given or performed 
by a party shall give the other any contractual right by custom, estoppel, or otherwise. 
12.6 Tenant Remedies. In the event Landlord shall neglect or fail to perform or 
observe any of the covenants, provisions or conditions contained in this Lease on its part to be 
performed or observed within thirty (30) days after written notice of default, then in that event 
Landlord shall be liable to Tenant for any and all actual damages sustained by Tenant as a result 
of Landlord's breach. In addition to and together with any monetary or other damages or 
remedies Tenant may receive at law or equity, Tenant may terminate this Lease if Landlord's 
breach of this Lease persists past such thirty (30) day period and Landlord is not actively and 
diligently engaged in curing the same (which cure shall be completed within a reasonable period 
of time). 
ARTICLE 13: SURRENDER OF THE PREMISES 
On the Lease Expiration Date or earlier termination of this Lease pursuant to the 
provisions hereof, Tenant shall quit and surrender the Premises to Landlord without delay, and in 
reasonable good order, condition and repair, ordinary wear and tear (and damage and destruction 
or condemnation if this Lease is terminated pursuant to either Article 10 or 1JQ excepted. Such 
surrender of the Premises shall be accomplished without the necessity for any payment therefor 
by Landlord. Upon such event, title to the Improvements shall automatically vest in Landlord 
without the execution of any further instrument; provided, however, Tenant covenants and 
agrees, upon either such event, to execute (at no cost or expense to Tenant) such appropriate 
documentation as may be reasonably requested by Landlord to transfer title to the Improvements 
to Landlord. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Article 14 below, no such 
surrender shall cause or be deemed to cause a merger of Landlord's Estate and Tenant's Estate, 
unless Landlord, and any Mortgagee holding a Permitted Mortgage, the lien of which was not 
reconveyed upon such surrender, expressly so agree in writing. 
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ARTICLE 14: PERMITTED SUBLEASES 
14.1 Tenant's Right to Sublease. Tenant may sub-ground lease or sub-space 
lease portions of the Premises during the Term of this Lease pursuant to Subleases with 
Subtenants who will occupy all or any portion of the Premises for the conduct of business 
consistent with the uses peimitted herein, subject to the requirements set forth in this Article 14. 
14.2 Required Sublease Terms. Each Sublease shall contain the following 
terms and conditions: 
(a) The Sublease shall state that it is subject and subordinate to this Lease and 
to any extension, modifications or amendments of, this Lease, unless Landlord specifically 
requires that such Sublease be prior and superior to this Lease; 
(b) That in the event of the cancellation or termination of this Lease prior to 
the Lease Expiration Date, the Subtenant under such Sublease shall make full and complete 
attornment to Landlord for the balance of the term of such Sublease with the same force and 
effect as though said Sublease were originally made directly from Landlord to the Subtenant; 
provided that such Subtenant has received a non-disturbance agreement from Landlord, as 
provided below. 
14.3 Non-Disturbance Agreements. Landlord shall issue a commercially 
reasonable subordination, non-disturbance, and attornment agreement (each, a "Non-
Disturbance Agreement"), to each Subtenant requesting same, which Non-Disturbance 
Agreement shall require such Subtenant to acknowledge in writing to the effect that this Lease is 
prior to and paramount to the Sublease, and providing that Landlord shall recognize the Sublease 
and not disturb the Subtenant's possession thereunder so long as Subtenant is not in default under 
its Sublease (subject to the following sentence) and agrees to attorn to Landlord for the balance 
of the term of such Sublease with the same force and effect as though said Sublease were 
originally made directly from Landlord to the Subtenant. Any such Non-E>isturbance Agreement 
may condition the Subtenant's right to non-disturbance on Landlord's continued receipt of Rent in 
the amount provided herein. In addition, such Non-Disturbance Agreement shall not prohibit the 
right of the Landlord to (or to require Tenant to) demolish Improvements on the Property other 
than (i) the premises under Sublease to which such Non-Disturbance Agreement relates and (ii) 
means of reasonable access thereto. 
14.4 Obligations under Lease. Landlord acknowledges and agrees that Tenant 
may assign any obligation or obligations under this Lease to any Subtenants without Landlord's 
prior consent; provided, that Tenant shall not be released from any such obligations in the event 
such Subtenant fails to perform same. 
ARTICLE 15: TRANSFER 
Landlord may not assign, convey and transfer its rights, interests and titles, or 
delegate any and all of its duties under this Lease. Tenant shall not transfer this Lease or its 
interest herein or in the Land, either direclly or indirectly, by operation of law or otherwise, 
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without Landlord's prior written consent, which Landlord will not unreasonably refuse. A 
transfer will not affect tenant's liability under this lease agreement. 
ARTICLE 16: TENANT'S OPTION TO PURCHASE PREMISES 
Landlord hereby grants to Tenant an option exercisable in Tenant's sole and 
absolute discretion to purchase Landlord's Estate ("Purchase Option"), on the following terms 
and conditions: 
16.1 Exercise Period. The Purchase Option may be exercised during the period 
commencing on the first day of the sixty-first (61st) month of the Term and ending on the Lease 
Expiration Date.. 
16.2 Condition Precedent. It shall be a condition precedent to Tenant's right to 
exercise the Purchase Option that (i) this Lease shall, at the time of delivery of Tenant's exercise 
notice, be in full force and effect, and (ii) there shall not then exist any Event of Default by 
Tenant as of the date of delivery of Tenant's exercise notice that Tenant has not begun diligently 
to cure in accordance herewith as of such date 
16.3 Exercise. Tenant shall exercise its Purchase Option by giving written 
notice thereof ("Purchase Option Notice") to Landlord within the option exercise period 
described in Section 16.1 above. The "Option Purchase Price" (herein so called), shall be as set 
forth in Section 16.4 below, 
16.4 Option Purchase Price and Terms. 
(a) Option Purchase Price. The purchase price shall be $750,000.00. 
(b) Purchase Terms. The Option Purchase Price shall be paid in cash at Purchase 
Closing. 
16.5 Closing of Option. Following the exercise by Tenant of the Purchase 
Option, the "Purchase Closing" (herein so called) shall occur within sixty (60) days of the date 
on which Landlord receives Tenant's Purchase Option Notice. Upon the Purchase Closing, 
(a) the Purchase Option Price for Landlord's Estate shall be paid to the Landlord or its successor 
as described in Section 16.4, (b) Landlord's Estate shall be conveyed to Tenant by grant deed, bill 
of sale, general assignment and other appropriate transfer instruments, all in form reasonably 
acceptable to both Tenant and Landlord; (c) Landlord's Estate shall be subject to only the matters 
described in Section 1.1 and other matters reasonably approved by Tenant; (d) Landlord's Estate 
shall be conveyed using a general warranty deed; (e) Tenant and Landlord shall each be 
responsible for their own attorneys' fees; (f) Landlord shall provide at its sole expense a standard 
form Owner's Title Insurance Policy issued by First American Title Insurance Company, and (g) 
Tenant shall be responsible for all property taxes and cost of closing. 
_ oi_ 
ARTICLE 17: NOTICES 
17.1 Any notice, approval, demand or other communication required or desired 
to be given pursuant to this Lease shall be in writing and shall be personally served (including by 
means of professional messenger service or air express service using receipts) or in lieu of 
personal service, deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, certified or registered 
mail, return receipt requested, and unless sooner received, each notice shall be deemed received 
seventy-two (72) hours after same shall have been so deposited in the United States mail 
addressed as set forth below: 
If to Landlord: Brown Family Holdings, L.C. 
c/o Rand D. Brown 
1434 R 9400 S.,Ste. 204 
Sandy, UT 84093 
If to Tenant: Holladay Towne Center, L.L.C. 
515 West Pickett Cir., Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attention: Tom Hulbert 
Either Landlord or Tenant may change its respective address by giving written notice to the other 
in accordance with the provisions of this Section. 
ARTICLE 18: ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATES 
18.1 Estoppel Certificates. Tenant agrees within thirty (30) days following 
request by Landlord or the holder of any deed of trust, mortgage or other encumbrance on 
Landlord's Estate to execute and deliver an Estoppel Certificate to whichever of them has 
requested the same. Landlord agrees promptly following request by Tenant or a Mortgagee to 
execute and deliver an Estoppel Certificate to whichever of them has requested the same. The 
term "Estoppel Certificate" shall mean an estoppel certificate, certifying (a) that this Lease is 
unmodified and in full force and effect, or, if modified, stating the nature of such modification 
and certifying that this Lease, as so modified, is in full force and effect and the date to which the 
Rent and other charges are paid in advance, if any, (b) that there are no uncured defaults on the 
part of Landlord and Tenant hereunder, or if there exist any uncured defaults on the part of 
Landlord and/or Tenant hereunder stating the nature of such uncured defaults on the part of 
Landlord and/or Tenant, and (c) the correctness of such other information respecting the status of 
this Lease as may be reasonably required by the party hereto requesting execution of such 
Estoppel Certificate. A party's failure to so execute and deliver an Estoppel Certificate following 
written request as required above, shall be conclusive upon such party that as of the date of said 
request for the same (a) that this Lease is in full force and effect, without modification except as 
may be represented by the party hereto requesting execution of such Estoppel Certificate, (b) that 
there are no uncured Events of Default in Landlord's or Tenant's obligations under this Lease 
except as may be represented by the party hereto requesting execution of such Estoppel 
Certificate, and (c) that no Rent has been paid in advance except as may be represented by the 
party hereto requesting execution of such Estoppel Certificate. 
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ARTICLE 19: ENFORCEMENT AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
19.1 In any proceeding or controversy associated with or arising out of this 
Lease or a claimed or actual breach hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from 
the other party as a part of the prevailing party's costs, such party's actual and reasonable 
attorneys" fees and court costs. 
ARTICLE 20: NO MERGER 
20.1 No Merger; Subleases. The voluntary or other surrender of this Lease by 
Tenant, or a mutual cancellation thereof, shall not work a merger and shall, at the option of 
Landlord, operate as an assignment to Landlord of any or all Subleases of Subtenants. 
20.2 Permitted Mortgages. Landlord agrees that neither the surrender, 
cancellation, expiration or termination of this Lease, nor Landlord's acquisition of Tenant's Estate 
by any means contemplated hereunder, shall, either by the election of Landlord or by operation of 
law, work a merger of Landlord's Estate and Tenant's Estate unless and until all indebtedness 
under any Permitted Mortgage has been repaid pursuant to the terms thereof. The lien of such 
Permitted Mortgage shall remain unaffected and in full force and effect upon and following the 
occurrence of any of the events described in the preceding sentence, and Landlord shall be 
subject to, and bound by, the provisions of such Permitted Mortgage as the successor tenant 
hereunder following the occurrence of any of such events. 
ARTICLE 21: QUIET ENJOYMENT - LANDLORDS RIGHT TO INSPECT 
21.1 Landlord covenants that, provided no Event of Default has occurred under 
the terms of the Lease and has continued beyond all applicable cure periods set forth in this Lease 
or any other written agreement between Landlord and any Mortgagee, Tenant shall have quiet 
and peaceful possession of the Premises as against Landlord and any person claiming the same 
by, through or under Landlord. Landlord reserves the right to enter the Premises and the 
Improvements during normal business hours upon reasonable prior written notice for purposes of 
conducting normal and periodic inspections of the Premises, provided such inspections shall be 
subject to the terms of, and shall not interfere with, the rights of any Subtenant under any 
Sublease. 
ARTICLE 22: GENERAL 
22.1 Captions. The captions used in this Lease are for the purpose of 
convenience only and shall not be construed to limit or extend the meaning of any part of this 
Lease. 
22.2 Counterparts. Any executed copy of this Lease shall be deemed an 
original for all purposes. This Lease may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which 
shall be an original, and all of which together shall constitute a single instrument. 
-25-
22.3 Time of Essence. Time is of the essence for the performance of each 
covenant and terra of this Lease. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any non-monetaiy obligation of 
Tenant or Landlord which cannot be satisfied due to war, strikes, acts of God or other events 
which are beyond the reasonable control of Tenant or Landlord, as the case may be (each, a 
"Force Majeure Event"), shall be excused until the cessation of such Force Majeure Event. In 
addition, Tenant's Rent obligations hereunder, and all dates for the performance of any of 
Tenant's other obligations hereunder, shall be automatically extended on a day for day basis in 
the event of any act of Landlord in violation of this Lease which actually delays Tenant's 
performance, as hereinabove set forth in this Lease, provided that (a) Tenant has previously 
notified Landlord of such fact in writing and Landlord has not cured the cause of such delay 
within thiee (3) days of the receipt of said notice and (b) in no event shall any Force Majeure 
Event excuse any obligation for longer than a 24 month peiiod from the occunence of such Force 
Majeuie Event. 
22.4 Severability. If any one or more of the provisions contained herein shall 
for any reason be held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, 
illegality or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision of this Lease, but this Lease 
shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal or unenforceable provision had not been contained 
herein. 
22.5 Interpretation. This Lease shall be construed and enforced in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. The language in all parts of this Lease shall in all cases be 
construed as a whole according to its fair meaning, and not strictly for or against either Landlord 
or Tenant. When the context of this Lease requires, the neuter gender includes the masculine, the 
feminine, a partnership or corporation or joint venture or other entity, and the singular includes 
the plural. 
22.6 Successors and Assigns. The covenants and agreements contained in this 
Lease shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their 
respective permitted heirs, successors, and assigns (to the extent this Lease is assignable). 
22.7 Waivers. The waiver of any breach of any term, covenant or condition 
herein contained shall not be deemed to be a waiver of such term, covenant or condition or any 
subsequent breach of the same or any other term, covenant or condition herein contained. 
22.8 Remedies. All remedies herein conferred shall be deemed cumulative and 
no one remedy shall be exclusive of any other remedy herein conferred or created by law. 
22.9 Good Faith. Except where a party hereto is specifically permitted to act in 
its sole and absolute discretion, each party hereto agrees to act reasonably and in good faith with 
respect to the performance and fulfillment of the terms of each and every covenant and condition 
contained in this Lease. 
22.10 No Partnership. The parties hereto agree that nothing contained in this 
Lease shall be deemed or construed as creating a partnership, joint venture, or association 
between Landlord and Tenant, or cause either party to be responsible in any way for the debts or 
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obligations of the other party, and neither the method of computing Rent nor any other provision 
contained in this Lease nor any acts of the parties hereto shall be deemed to create any 
relationship between Landlord and Tenant other than the relationship of landlord and tenant 
22.11 Integration. This Lease, and the Exhibits and addenda, if any, attached 
hereto, constitute the entire agreement between the parties, and there are no agreements or 
representations between the parties except as expressed herein. The recitals set forth above are 
incorporated herein and made a part of this Lease. All prior negotiations and agreements 
between Landlord and Tenant with respect to the subject matter hereof are superseded by this 
Lease. Except as otherwise provided herein, no subsequent change or addition to this Lease shall 
be binding unless in writing and signed by the parties hereto. 
22.12 Commissions. Landlord and Tenant each represent and warrant to the 
other that they have employed no broker, finder or other person in connection with the 
transactions contemplated under this Lease which might result in the other party being held liable 
for all or any portion of a commission hereunder. Landlord and Tenant each hereby agiee to 
indemnify and hold the other free and harmless from and against all claims and liability arising 
by reason of the incorrectness of the representations and warranties made by such party in this 
Section, including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs. 
22.13 Survival. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this 
Lease, the provisions (including, without limitation, covenants, agreements, representations, 
warranties, obligations, and liabilities described therein) of this Lease which from their sense and 
context are intended to survive the expiration or earlier termination of this Lease (whether or not 
such provision expressly provides as such) shall survive such expiration or earlier termination of 
this Lease and continue to be binding upon the applicable party. 
[SIGNATURES ON NEXT PAGE] 
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LANDLORD AND TENANT hereby enter into and execute this Lease as of the date first 
set forth above. 
LANDLORD 
BROWN FAMILY HOLDING, L.C. 





HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, L.L.C, 
a Utah limited liability company 
By: */Vv<rr7?&L <?• '^/ikJ^^?'^ 





Known as 2240 E. Laney Avenue, Holladay, Salt Lake County, Utah and Legally Described as 




1 Propei ty Taxes and Assessments accruing for the year 2005 and thereafter. Landlord 
Wairants that all previous property Taxes for any year prior to the year 2005 tax yeai have 
been paid 
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